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The Stock Exchange as Multi-sided Platform and 
the Future of the National Market System 
Steven McNamara* 
Since Regulation National Market System (Regulation NMS) came 
into force a decade ago, computer technology has transformed the stock 
markets. While Regulation NMS benefited investors by lowering stated 
transaction costs, it also created today’s complex and fragmented trading 
system. An increasing amount of trading now occurs off-exchange in dark 
pools and other “non-lit” venues, and hidden costs proliferate. In addition 
to the profits taken by high-frequency traders, these include the defensive 
costs of the technological arms race, the possibility of another “Flash 
Crash,” public suspicions of “rigged” stock markets, reduced allocative 
efficiency, and rising proprietary data fees paid by stockbrokers and 
institutional investors. In prioritizing the goal of competition, Regulation 
NMS failed to take into account the stock exchange’s inherent economic 
nature as a multi-sided platform and the negative effects of setting the 
existing exchanges into competition with one another. Furthermore, 
digital technology undermines a number of Regulation NMS’s grounding 
assumptions. Given the nature of modern stock exchange as a digital 
multi-sided platform, it is time to reconsider the central limit order book 
(CLOB) proposals made in the 1970s through the early 2000s. An updated 
proposal for a “virtual CLOB” would allow the current exchanges to 
remain in existence, thereby avoiding a single monopoly exchange, while 
eliminating or mitigating many of the most pressing problems of the 
current system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate stocks currently trade on over fifty venues in the 
United States: thirteen stock markets,1 classified as “exchanges” 
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and over forty alter-
native trading systems (ATSs),2 which include both dark pools and 
electronic communication networks (ECNs). Significant amounts of 
stock also trade in the internal matching engines of large broker-
dealers. The highly fragmented equity markets are relatively new, 
since before 2007 the New York Stock Exchange (the NYSE) 
accounted for 80% of the daily trading volume in NYSE-listed 
stocks.3 Now, no one exchange has more than 15% of the trading 
volume, and no exchange family more than 25%.4 The fundamental 
causes of this rapid change of affairs are the implementation of 
Regulation National Market System (Regulation NMS) and the 
technological change of the past twenty years. Regulation NMS is a 
complicated regulatory compromise that knits together the former-
ly separate stock exchanges into one national market system yet 
preserves the independence of the individual exchanges. Under 
Regulation NMS the exchanges are meant to be competing venues 
for the consummation of trades. 
In fact, Regulation NMS has been largely successful in accom-
plishing its objective of reducing stated transaction costs for 
investors.5 While other factors such as technological innovation and 
the decimalization of prices share credit for this development, the 
Order Protection Rule of Regulation NMS does force exchanges to 
 
 1. See NYSE, Nasdaq and . . . ? Get to Know the U.S.’s Stock Exchanges, Part 1, FINRA 
(Aug. 17, 2016), www.finra.org/investors/nyse-nasdaq-and-get-know-uss-stock-exchanges 
-part-1. 
 2. See Market Structure: Volume and Liquidity Update, COWEN ATM (Jan. 23, 2017) 
[hereinafter COWEN ATM], http://www.cowen.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/2017 
-01-23-Cowen-Volume-Liquidity-Update.pdf (listing forty-three dark pools); see also GARY 
SHORTER & RENA S. MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43739, DARK POOLS IN EQUITY 
TRADING: POLICY CONCERNS AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 3 (2014). 
 3. See James J. Angel, Lawrence E. Harris & Chester S. Spatt, Equity Trading in the 21st 
Century, 5 Q.J. FIN. 1, 5 (2015) (stating that the NYSE had 80% market share in its listed stocks 
in 2003). 
 4. See John Polise, A Bridge Too Far: A Critical Analysis of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s Approach to Equity Market Regulation, 11 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 285, 332 
(2017); COWEN ATM, supra note 2. 
 5. See Angel et al., supra note 3, at 1. 
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compete with one another through protecting the best-priced quote 
currently displayed on a registered exchange. 
On the other hand, Regulation NMS shares much of the blame 
for creating a highly fragmented marketplace. Not only is trading 
dispersed among thirteen different registered exchanges but an 
increasing amount occurs off-exchange in unlit, “dark” venues. 
Dark trading has grown in response to the risks of trading in lit 
venues, where high-frequency traders are able to exploit timing 
advantages to the detriment of slower traders. The fragmented 
marketplace drives another cost, the need for traders to purchase 
in-depth, proprietary market data from the exchanges that goes 
beyond what is required to be made publicly available by the secu-
rities information processor (the SIP). Rising data fees are paid not 
only by high-frequency traders but by institutional investors and 
stockbrokers who feel they need to have such data in order to 
remain competitive and meet their legal duties to clients. Finally, 
the rise of high-frequency trading (HFT) in the context of frag-
mented markets contributes to the risk of market crashes, as was 
experienced in the “Flash Crash” of May 6, 2010. In sum, while 
stated transaction costs have diminished, hidden costs from frag-
mentation, rapidly increasing data fees, and the risk of catastrophic 
market dislocation have generated significant disquiet on the part 
of stockbrokers, institutional investors, and advocates for the inves-
ting public. The historic mission of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (the SEC) to provide for investor protection is there-
fore implicated in the debate over the current market structure 
under Regulation NMS. 
In considering the way forward, it is important to remember 
that the Order Protection Rule, the lynchpin of Regulation NMS, is 
itself a compromise. Rule 611 only protects the quotes at the “top-
of-the-book,” the best-priced quote in the market at the time. It does 
not provide “depth-of-book” protection to quotes lower down in 
an exchange’s order book, nor does it provide timing protection to 
previously entered quotes in accordance with the usual price-time 
priority rules used at the individual exchanges.6 The various 
 
 6. See John McPartland, Recommendations for Equitable Allocations of Trades in High Fre-
quency Trading Environments 10–11 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Policy Discussion Paper, Vol. 
PDP, No. 2013-01, rev. Jul. 2014). See generally LARRY HARRIS, TRADING & EXCHANGES: MARKET 
MICROSTRUCTURE FOR PRACTITIONERS 116–20 (2003) (rule-based order-matching systems). 
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proposals discussed in the long run-up to the promulgation of 
Regulation NMS contain alternatives that should now be reconsid-
ered as the digitization of stock trading exacerbates the problems 
latent within the governing regulatory regime. 
In fact, by the time it came into force in 2007, Regulation NMS 
was already becoming obsolete.7 The alternative “hard CLOB” 
proposal floated during the mid-70s, and which briefly reappeared 
in 2000, may offer a more attractive market structure in the digital 
age. A virtual central limit order book (CLOB) functioning as a 
routing system that provides depth-of-book protection could ac-
complish two goals: First, it would eliminate many of the specific 
problems that arise from the interaction of various heterogenous 
groups of traders in the current highly fragmented system. Second, 
it could form the basis for the governance structure of a key piece 
of financial markets infrastructure that could mitigate the danger 
of digital monopoly, or rather oligopoly, among the exchanges. The 
nature of the stock exchange as a multi-sided platform (MSP) 
means that as the exchange industry becomes wholly digital, the 
pressures winnowing the exchanges to a single exchange, or small 
group of exchanges, intensify. A CLOB as a routing service, but not 
a single exchange, would allow the separate incumbent exchanges 
to remain in existence, providing for a large degree of competition. 
Furthermore, the governance of such a routing service would allow 
for the interests of non-exchange stakeholders, primarily but not 
only institutional investors, to be represented. Ultimately, it seems 
that the future of the stock exchanges will present public policy 
challenges similar to those posed by other dominant MSPs in the 
digital era. 
This Article has three parts. Part I reviews the recent changes in 
the stock market in terms of five implicit assumptions of Regulation 
NMS disrupted by digital technology. Part II then turns to an 
examination of recent economic thinking on multi-sided platforms 
in digital business environments. Since the business of running a 
 
 7. See generally Chris Brummer, Disruptive Technology and Securities Regulation, 84 
FORDHAM L. REV. 977, 1032–33 (2015); Christopher Groskopf, The Modern Stock Market Is a 
Badly Designed Computer System, QUARTZ (June 15, 2016), https://qz.com/662009/the-sec-
tried-to-fix-a-finance-problem-and-created-a-computer-science-problem-instead (“Latency 
arbitrage is a byproduct of the fact that Reg NMS neglected to take into account the problems 
associated with building a distributed computer system.”). 
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financial exchange has, like many others, been transformed into a 
digital one, many of the economic conditions identified as 
operative in digital MSPs are increasingly applicable to stock 
markets. Stock markets have some key differences from other types 
of MSPs, but they do share some important characteristics, in 
particular the operation of network effects and the use of 
differential pricing mechanisms across the sides of the platform. 
Part III draws on the history of the development of the national 
market system to formulate a proposal for a router functioning as a 
virtual CLOB. A virtual CLOB would eliminate many of the most 
important problems with the current system, while also potentially 
providing a useful governance regime for a critical piece of 
financial markets infrastructure. 
I. THE OBSOLESCENCE OF REGULATION NMS: 
FIVE ASSUMPTIONS DISRUPTED BY ALGORITHMIC TRADING 
Now appears to be a good time to step back from the 
controversies of recent years regarding high-frequency trading in 
the stock markets. The Equity Market Structure Advisory 
Committee, convened in 2015 by the SEC,8 has failed to issue any 
recommendations on market structure issues,9 and the Tabb Group 
reports that the profits of high-frequency traders have shrunk 
radically in the past few years, from a high of approximately 
$7 billion in 2009, to an estimated $1.1 billion in 2016.10 This radical 
decline in profitability would seem to indicate that the scale of the 
 
 8. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Members of New Equity 
Market Structure Advisory Committee (Jan. 13, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/press 
release/2015-5.html. 
 9. See Memorandum from the EMSAC Regulation NMS Subcommittee to the Equity 
Market Structure Advisory Committee (EMSAC) (April 3, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/spot 
light/emsac/emaac-regulation-nms-subcommittee-discussion-framework-040317.pdf (“Sub-
ject: Framework for Rule 611 & 610 Discussion”); see also Rob Daly, Trade-Through Review 
Going Slowly, TRADERS MAG. (Apr. 7, 2017), http://www.tradersmagazine.com/news/buy 
side/trade-through-review-going-slowly-116104-1.html. 
 10. See Alexander Osipovich, High-Frequency Traders Fall on Hard Times, WALL STREET J. 
(Mar. 21, 2017, 6:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/high-frequency-traders-fall-on-hard-
times-1490092200; see also Gregory Meyer, Nicole Bullock & Joe Rennison, How High-
Frequency Trading Hit a Speed Bump, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content 
/d81f96ea-d43c-11e7-a303-9060cb1e5f44. 
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problems associated with HFT is shrinking.11 HFT appears to be a 
maturing industry in which the total amount of profit is declining 
and less agile entrants are being driven out or acquired by more 
powerful ones.12 This decline in profits may lessen the pressure for 
a regulatory fix. Nevertheless, the changes wrought by algorithmic 
trading, some of which are highly problematic, are not going away. 
A useful way into the controversies surrounding Regulation NMS 
is to examine a number of its grounding assumptions, which make 
sense in a world of physical trading environments but break down 
in the relatively disintermediated world of electronic stock trading. 
A. Instantaneous Communication Between Markets Is Possible 
A bedrock assumption of Regulation NMS is that communi-
cation between market centers will occur instantaneously. The 
drafters of Regulation NMS were in fact aware of timing issues 
concerning the operation of the stock markets, but the main 
distinction they had in mind was that of automated versus manual 
quotations.13 Manual quotations are those offered by a floor trader, 
whereas automated quotations are those in a system such as 
NASDAQ’s, which would be acted on without delay as soon as 
they were entered into the system. Regulation NMS, however, 
mostly ignores an entirely different category of timing delays: those 
arising from the time it takes for automated messages to travel from 
one market center (i.e., a computer server) to another.14 
The basic informational architecture of Regulation NMS arises 
out of the interplay between Rule 611’s Order Protection Rule and 
the various “Plans” that are set up to consolidate and disseminate 
order information and quotations to the market at large. Rule 611 
 
 11. An important caveat to this conclusion is that exchanges and other service 
providers may simply be arrogating an increased share of the profits to themselves through 
increased charges for the proprietary data, co-location, and technology services required to 
compete in the HFT arena. See Orçun Kaya, High-Frequency Trading, DEUTSCHE BANK RES., 
(May 24, 2016), https://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/RPS_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000 
454703/Research_Briefing%3A_High-frequency_trading.PDF. 
 12. See Samuel Agini, High-Frequency Traders Feel the Pressure of One-Way Markets, FIN. 
NEWS LONDON (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/high-frequency-trad 
ers-feel-the-pressure-of-one-way-markets-20170317. 
 13. See, e.g., Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 34-51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 
37,519–20, 37,531 (June 29, 2005). 
 14. See infra note 21. 
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prohibits “trade throughs” of all “protected quotations” in Regu-
lation NMS stocks.15 This means that a trading center is required to 
have policies in place that prevent a trade from being consummated 
on its facility when a “protected quotation,”16 an automated quota-
tion at a better price on a registered exchange, is displayed else-
where in the national market system. In this situation, the order is 
instead to be routed to that other exchange. 
In order for this system to work, one or more SIPs17 are required 
to act as central information processors. The SIPs receive and collate 
the quotes from each exchange and then disseminate the best ones 
as the national best bid/offer18 (the NBBO) to the market at large. 
Rules 602 and 603 govern this activity. Rule 602 requires the ex-
changes to “make available to vendors the best bid, best offer, and 
aggregate quotation sizes” for each listed security.19 Rule 603(b) in 
turn requires the exchanges to “act jointly pursuant to one or more 
effective national market system plans” to disseminate “all consoli-
dated information for an individual NMS stock through a single 
plan processor.”20 These rules call for the basic informational 
architecture of Regulation NMS, consisting of a central information 
processor (the SIP) that collates the information it receives from the 
various market centers and then redistributes it to the market at 
large as the NBBO. 
It gradually became apparent after Regulation NMS came into 
force that trading conducted within the timing gaps between the 
market centers, and between the market centers and the SIP, was 
 
 15. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.611(a)(1) (2018). 
 16. See id. § 242.600(b)(58) (defining “protected quotation”). 
 17. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(22)(A) (2012) (defining “securities information processor”). 
This definition was added to the 1934 Act by the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975. The 
SIP was seen by the 1975 Amendments as the mechanism that would allow the 
accomplishment of its third objective, to assure “the availability to brokers, dealers, and 
investors of information with respect to quotations for and transactions in securities.” Id. 
§ 78k-1(a)(1)(C)(iii). 
 18. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.600(b)(42) (“National best bid and national best offer means, 
with respect to quotations for an NMS security, the best bid and best offer for such security 
that are calculated . . . on a current and continuing basis by a plan processor pursuant to an 
effective national market system plan.”). 
 19. Id. § 242.602(a)(1)(i). 
 20. Id. § 242.603(b). 
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important.21 Regulation NMS, however, sidesteps the issue of these 
timing gaps.22 During the gestation of Regulation NMS, the main 
focus of regulators as far as timing was concerned centered on the 
interplay between manual and automated quotations. Within the 
decade, however, it became apparent that significant activity 
occurred within periods that were considerably shorter than the 
periods of three or ten or thirty seconds that the debate over 
integrating manual quotations into the automated system con-
sidered. These gaps consisted of periods measured in milliseconds 
(thousandths of a second) and even microseconds (millionths of a 
second), from one second down to two milliseconds or even less.23 
The inevitable delay between the NBBO as reported by the SIP and 
what may be the best price at the exchanges prompted financial 
sociologist Donald MacKenzie to characterize Regulation NMS as 
assuming a Newtonian world, whereas the contemporary markets 
are Einsteinian, “in which the time that communication takes, even 
 
 21. See, e.g., An Old SIP in a Modern Market, TRADERS MAG. (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www. 
tradersmagazine.com/issues/26_356/An-Old-SIP-In-a-Modern-Market-111619-1.html. 
Michael Lewis’s Flash Boys (2014) brought the problem of the staleness of the SIP to public 
attention, but protagonist Brad Katsuyama (now CEO of IEX) began grappling with the 
problems of negotiating the latencies between the various exchange servers in 2007. 
MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS 34 (2014). Wall Street Journal reporter Scott Patterson also 
explored these problems in a 2013 book. SCOTT PATTERSON, DARK POOLS: THE RISE OF THE 
MACHINE TRADERS AND THE RIGGING OF THE U.S. STOCK MARKET (2013). 
 22. The main discussion of timing differences down to the sub-second level occurs in 
the context of automated vs. manual quotations. See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496 
(June 29, 2005). The discussion of the “flickering quotation” exception to the trade-through 
rule does evidence awareness of the problem of timing gaps but concludes with the 
statement that “[t]he Commission also notes that opportunities for arbitrage between trading 
centers displaying different prices for the same NMS stock would exist irrespective of 
whether the Commission adopted an order protection rule . . . .” Id. at 37,523; see also id. at 
37,528 (acknowledging that intermarket price protection without an opt-out exception may 
interfere with “extremely short-term trading strategies”); id. at n.215 (discussing concerns 
over “‘clock drift’ and time lags between different data sources.”). 
 23. See An Old SIP in a Modern Market, supra note 21 (estimating the latency of the SIP 
as 800 milliseconds in 2006). In Lewis’s Flash Boys, message transmission times in 2009 from 
lower Manhattan to the exchange servers in New Jersey range from four to seven milli-
seconds. See LEWIS, supra note 21, at 71. Transmission times from co-located servers at the 
exchanges are in the 0.2- to 0.35-millisecond range. See Deutsche Boerse Group’s Co-location 
Service in Cooperation with Equinix, EUREX EXCHANGE, www.eurexchange.com/exchange 
-en/technology/co-location-services (last visited Oct. 17, 2018). Processing times at the SIPs are 
now as low as an astonishing twenty microseconds (0.020 milliseconds). See Nicole Bullock & 
Philip Stafford, Nasdaq Upgrade Raises Market Data Questions, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2016), 
https://www.ft.com/content/0de0a15c-9933-11e6-8f9b-70e3cabccfae. 
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at the speed of light, is salient.”24 Regulation NMS implicitly pre-
sumes that instantaneous communication between market centers 
is possible, whereas the development of high-speed computing 
technology means that gaps of much less than one second are 
very meaningful. 
B. Limit Orders Are Good, and Regulation Should 
Operate to Protect Them 
A second assumption is that limit orders are good and that 
regulation should operate to protect them.25 While order types have 
mushroomed in the past decade, limit orders and market orders are 
the two basic order types used by equities traders, as well as the 
building blocks for more complex types. A market order is a simple 
command to a broker to go into the market and purchase (or sell) a 
given number of shares at the prevailing best price. A limit order, 
on the other hand, is an order offering to buy (a bid) or sell (an offer) 
a given amount at a given price.26 Assume that the NBBO for 
General Motors (GM) stock is currently $42.50 (bid) and $42.55 
(offer). A trader wishing to sell GM, but who thought the current 
best price to buy was too low, could submit a new limit order to sell 
1000 shares at $42.53. This limit order would now establish a new 
best offer of $42.53, and the order would remain open until either a 
buyer responded to this limit order and “hit” the quote, or the 
trader cancelled it. 
Limit orders play several important roles. Most importantly, 
they set the prevailing prices. By announcing a price at which 
traders are willing to buy or sell, limit orders are the basis for 
market orders, since traders submitting a market order usually do 
so on the basis of the current NBBO. And the combined limit orders 
in the various order books of the exchanges constitute the “depth” 
 
 24. Donald MacKenzie, A Sociology of Algorithms: High-Frequency Trading and the 
Shaping of Markets 41–42 (June 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.sps.ed.ac.uk 
/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/156298/Algorithms25.pdf. 
 25. See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,505 (discussing commenters who “stress[] 
that limit orders are the cornerstone of efficient, liquid markets and should be afforded as 
much protection as possible”). For a critical appraisal, see Hearing on Equity Market Structure: 
A Review of SEC Regulation NMS Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. 
of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. (2014) [hereinafter Lofchie] (written testimony of 
Steven Lofchie). 
 26. See Michael Morelli, Regulating Secondary Markets in the High Frequency Age: A 
Principled and Coordinated Approach, 6 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 79, 82 n.81 (2016). 
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of liquidity in a particular stock. This pool of liquidity is one of the 
central reasons for forming a stock market, as greater liquidity in a 
stock greatly increases its value to traders, who often wish to exit 
an investment quickly and at the highest price available. A deep 
pool of liquidity makes it possible to do so. Not only does it signal 
a willing buyer at a pre-established price but depth of liquidity 
ensures that an individual small purchase or sale will have a small-
to-minimal effect on the prices of the remaining shares. Finally, a 
limit order itself is a type of option: it provides other traders the 
opportunity to make a transaction at a set price for as long as the 
quote remains on the exchange’s order book.27 Today, it is the limit 
order’s function as an option that threatens its economic viability. 
Posting a limit order always entailed the risk that another trader 
would see a bid as too high or an offer as too low. This judgment 
could be based on fundamental analysis, inside information, short-
term predictions of market momentum, or other factors. But 
whatever the reason, if such a judgment were correct, in the zero-
sum game of trading the person posting the limit order would 
suffer a loss if her quote were hit. The risk for a trader submitting a 
limit order (or conversely, its value to the market at large) is a 
function of three factors: the discrepancy of the price in the order 
versus the “true” value of the stock, the number of shares at stake, 
and the amount of time the order remains open.28 The rise of HFT 
appears to have increased the average magnitude of the first and 
third factors. High-speed computing technology greatly increases 
the ability of high-frequency traders to find and act on information, 
including price momentum information. This heightens the ad-
verse selection risk associated with limit orders.29 It also appears 
that in the new world of HFT, the effective measure of time is 
greatly sped up as compared to the old manual markets. Now, a far 
greater volume of orders is entered per second, with most quickly 
cancelled, than in the past.30 Since the “volume clock” of the current 
markets is running so much faster than it used to, submitting limit 
 
 27. See Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,526–27 
(June 29, 2005). 
 28. See Lofchie, supra note 25 at 6. 
 29. See Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, The New Stock 
Market: Sense and Nonsense, 65 DUKE L.J. 191, 238–42 (2015) (discussing “slow-market arbitrage”). 
 30. See David Easley, Marcos M. López de Prado & Maureen O’Hara, The Volume 
Clock: Insights into the High-Frequency Paradigm, 39 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 19 (2012). 
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orders in an old-fashioned way, without the wherewithal to moni-
tor all markets and information sources and quickly pull the order 
if negative information is spotted, becomes significantly riskier 
than before. Because of these changes in how the stock markets 
function, the risk inherent in limit orders has increased. 
The natural response of many non-HFT traders has been to 
migrate away from the lit markets. This is largely because dark 
pools do not publicly post quotes for all to see and react to. By not 
posting the quote, any information entailed in the limit order is not 
revealed to the market at large, although there do appear to be ways 
to access it.31 Furthermore, a number of dark pools have marketed 
themselves as inhospitable to HFT, or as actively preventing HFT 
shops from trading in their pools.32 Even though such claims have 
not always been truthful, dark pools do function as “protective 
coves,” as opposed to the “naked bazaars” of the lit markets.33 The 
growth of dark trading will be explored in greater detail in 
section II.B, but at this point it is important to realize that it is driven 
by the costs, including risk, of trading the old-fashioned way with 
limit orders on an exchange. The grounding assumption of 
Regulation NMS, that resting limit orders are good and that 
regulation should serve to protect them, may remain true in a 
normative sense, but increasing adverse selection risk undermines 
the economic basis many traders previously had for using them. 
C. The Securities Information Processor (the SIP) 
Presents Useful Information 
A corollary to the first assumption of instantaneous commu-
nication between markets is that the SIP presents useful infor-
mation. The SIP is the market institution responsible for collecting, 
 
 31. See Rob Curran, Watch Out for Sharks in Dark Pools, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 19, 2008, 
11:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121911298392752051. See generally Gregory 
Scopino, The (Questionable) Legality of High-Speed “Pinging” and “Front Running” in the Futures 
Markets, 47 CONN. L. REV. 607 (2015). 
 32. See Scott Patterson & Bradley Hope, Barclays Dark Pool Drew Early Alarms, WALL 
STREET J. (July 20, 2014, 7:41 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/barclays-dark-pool-drew 
-early-alarms-on-fast-trading-1405898592; Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Barclays, 
Credit Suisse Charged with Dark Pool Violations (Jan. 31, 2016), https://www.sec.gov 
/news/pressrelease/2016-16.html. 
 33. See Lofchie, supra note 25, at 5. 
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collating, and distributing the quotes that make up the NBBO.34 
Regulation NMS conceives of the SIP as the central informational 
node in the market system, which should operate to place all 
traders and investors on an even playing field, as well as to prevent 
exploitation of traders through the exercise of market power over 
the valuable market data by the exchanges. A crucial assumption 
of Regulation NMS therefore is that the information presented by 
the SIP is useful to market participants. As with the second 
assumption above, the failure of this assumption is a matter of 
degree—it is not entirely false, nor is it entirely true. 
The SIP is the descendant of the “consolidated tape” which 
provided transaction data to the market at large in the pre-
computerized era.35 While it was defined in the 1975 Amend-
ments,36 it has been woven into the fabric of Regulation NMS. Rules 
602 and 603 concern the provision and dissemination of quotations 
in Regulation NMS stocks. Rule 602 requires that an exchange 
collect quotes from broker-dealers and make those quotes available 
to “vendors.”37 Rule 603 mandates that each exchange act pursuant 
 
 34. There are presently three SIPs for cash equities: Tape A (covering NYSE-listed 
stocks), Tape B (covering stocks, structured products, and ETFs listed on neither the NYSE 
or NASDAQ), and Tape C (covering NASDAQ-listed stocks). The Tape A and Tape B SIPs 
are governed by the Consolidated Tape Association, a consortium of exchanges, and 
managed by the NYSE. The Tape C SIP is governed and administered by NASDAQ. See Larry 
Tabb, Latency Arbitrage and the Problem with the SIP, TABBFORUM (July 19, 2016), 
https://tabbforum.com/opinions/latency-arbitrage-and-the-problem-with-the-sip. The OPRA 
SIP covers exchange-traded securities options. See OPRA Overview, OPRA, https://opradata 
.com/overview/opra_over.jsp (last visited Dec. 30, 2018). 
 35. See Jerry W. Markham, High-Speed Trading on Stock and Commodity Markets—From 
Courier Pigeons to Computers, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 601 n.284 (2015); Dale A. Oesterle, 
Regulation NMS: Has the SEC Exceeded Its Congressional Mandate to Facilitate a “National Market 
System” in Securities Trading?, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 613, 630–35 (2005). 
 36. Section 3(6) of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 added section 3(a)(22) to 
the Exchange Act: 
  The term “securities information processor” means any person engaged in 
the business of (i) collecting, processing, or preparing for distribution or publi-
cation, or assisting, participating in, or coordinating the distribution or publication 
of, information with respect to transactions in or quotations for any security (other 
than an exempted security) or (ii) distributing or publishing (whether by means of 
a ticker tape, a communications network, a terminal display device, or otherwise) 
on a current and continuing basis information with respect to such transactions 
or quotations. 
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(22)(A). 
 37. The term “vendor” here refers to a securities information processor. See Regulation 
NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 34-51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,574 n.688 (June 29, 2005). 
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to “one or more . . . national market system plans to disseminate 
consolidated information, including a national best bid and best 
offer, on quotations for and transactions in national market 
stocks.”38 A SIP is established under a “national market system 
plan.”39 Rule 603(a)(1) provides that “[a]ny exclusive processor, or 
any broker or dealer with respect to information for which it is the 
exclusive source, that distributes information . . . to a securities 
information processor shall do so on terms that are fair and 
reasonable.”40 Rule 603(a)(2) requires that “[a]ny national securities 
exchange, . . . broker, or dealer that distributes information with 
respect to quotations for or transactions in an NMS stock to a 
securities information processor . . . shall do so on terms that are 
not unreasonably discriminatory.”41 The SIP is therefore the entity 
under Regulation NMS that is charged with collating and distri-
buting this information to the market at large. Also important is the 
distinction between an exclusive source of information providing it 
on terms that are “fair and reasonable,” and all other providers 
doing so on terms that are “not unreasonably discriminatory.”42 
The development of high-speed trading led to great reductions 
in the latency (the time it takes for messages to be transmitted) of 
messages to and from the servers of the exchanges, which has had 
the corresponding effect of making the NBBO as communicated by 
the SIP increasingly “stale.”43 In addition to the simple effect of 
decreases in message transmission times increasing the relative 
significance of processing times at the SIP, co-location services and 
the proprietary, enriched data feeds offered by the exchanges have 
contributed greatly to its obsolescence. Co-location services allow 
HFT firms to rent space in the facilities that host an exchange’s 
servers, so messages will reach an exchange server in the least 
 
 38. 17 C.F.R. § 242.603(b) (2018). 
 39. Id. § 242.600(b)(43). 
 40. Id. § 242.603(a)(1). 
 41. Id. § 242.603(a)(2). 
 42. Id. § 242.603(a); see also Fox et al., supra note 29, at 270–71. 
 43. See Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
61358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3593, 3601 (Jan. 21, 2010) (estimating latency of the SIP at approximately 
five milliseconds); Shengwei Ding, John Hanna & Terrence Hendershott, How Slow Is the 
NBBO? A Comparison with Direct Exchange Feeds, 49 FIN. REV. 313, 320 (2014) (estimating 
latency of the SIP as approximately 1.5 milliseconds in 2012). 
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possible amount of time.44 Co-location is the most obvious example 
of traders positioning themselves in a way that makes the SIP stale, 
but proprietary data feeds and the SEC’s interpretation of 
Rule 603(a)(2) compound its effects. Proprietary data feeds are 
delivered directly to co-located servers. They provide a greater 
depth of information than the SIP, whose NBBO just presents the 
best bid and offer nationally. Proprietary data feeds show an 
exchange’s complete “book” in each stock, i.e., all the limit orders 
going deeper into the book away from the best prices.45 Order 
cancellation information is also available, which allows high-
frequency traders the ability to draw a picture of the direction of 
the market in a particular stock. The deeper and more detailed 
information offered by the proprietary data feeds is essential for 
HFT, which requires a more complete picture of the market to 
engage in many short-term trading strategies.46 
A key regulatory factor for proprietary data feeds is 
Rule 603(a)(2), which states that an exchange “that distributes 
information with respect to quotations for or transactions in an 
NMS stock to a securities information processor, broker, dealer, or 
other persons shall do so on terms that are not unreasonably 
discriminatory.”47 The SEC interprets this to allow an exchange to 
send information from its server to co-located servers, typically of 
high-frequency traders, simultaneously with its transmission to the 
SIP.48 This may have seemed sensible in 2005, but with the 
development of high-speed transmission technology, and the 
 
 44. See Brummer, supra note 7, at 1030. 
 45. See SAL ARNUK & JOSEPH SALUZZI, BROKEN MARKETS: HOW HIGH FREQUENCY 
TRADING AND PREDATORY PRACTICES ON WALL STREET ARE DESTROYING INVESTOR CONFI-
DENCE AND YOUR PORTFOLIO 111–17 (2011). Regulation NMS rejected a depth-of-book 
requirement for the SIP, stating that the basic information of prices, sizes, and market 
identifiers for the NBBO would be sufficient for retail investors, though the SEC also foresaw 
other traders purchasing deeper information from market centers. See Regulation NMS, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,569 (June 29, 2005). 
 46. See IRENE ALDRIDGE, HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
ALGORITHMIC STRATEGIES AND TRADING SYSTEMS 53–74 (2d ed. 2013) (discussing the use of 
both Level I and the deeper Level II categories of data by HFT’ers). 
 47. 17 C.F.R. § 242.603(a)(2). 
 48. Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 34-51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,567 
(June 29, 2005) (“Stated another way, adopted Rule 603(a) prohibits an SRO or broker-dealer 
from transmitting data to a vendor or user any sooner than it transmits the data to a Network 
processor.”); see also Fox et al., supra note 29, at 269–71. 
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corresponding lack of technological development at the SIP,49 it 
meant that by the time messages were received at the SIP, proces-
sed there, and then released to the market at large, the NBBO was 
significantly stale.50 The provision of enriched data feeds to co-
located servers greatly reduces the value of the information offered 
by the SIP, creating a two-tiered marketplace. High-speed traders 
pay extra to be at the front of the line, while those relying on the 
NNBO as communicated through the SIP are in back. 
There are indications that the problems associated with the SIP 
may be lessening, however. In 2016, NASDAQ upgraded the tech-
nology of the SIP it operates, reducing latency times from more 
than one millisecond to just over half of a millisecond today.51 
Reductions in this latency time are important, although in principle 
there will always be some delay in the NBBO as reported by the SIP 
in our current system. Improvements at the SIP could also be a 
contributing factor in the declining profits of HFT firms and are 
important for the effective operation of the national market system. 
But there will always be an irreducible delay in the propagation of 
the SIP, so to some extent the assumption that the SIP presents 
valuable information will always be somewhat wrong. The fact that 
many traders are willing to pay substantial amounts for co-location 
and proprietary data feeds casts doubt on this assumption. 
D. Sufficient Incentives Exist for Market Makers to Supply Liquidity 
A fourth assumption of Regulation NMS is that sufficient 
incentives exist for market makers to provide liquidity. In the old 
NYSE “specialist system,” where specialists were granted a 
monopoly position as market maker in the stocks they covered, 
there was sufficient economic incentive to act as a market maker in 
times of market stress. The demise of the specialist system and its 
 
 49. See An Old SIP in a Modern Market, supra note 21. 
 50. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 51. Although processing times at the upgraded SIP are in the 50-microsecond range, 
including transmission times to other market centers would place the latency of the SIP in 
the 500-microsecond range. See Ivy Schmerken, Nasdaq OMX Won Over SIP Committee with 
Latency Reductions & Tech Upgrades, INFORMATIONWEEK WALLSTREET & TECH. (Nov. 7, 2014, 
12:35 PM) http://www.wallstreetandtech.com/infrastructure/nasdaq-omx-won-over-sip 
-committee-with-latency-reductions-and-tech-upgrades/d/d-id/1317316.html; Tabb, supra 
note 34. 
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replacement by “Designated Market Makers” (or DMMs) (as well 
as “Supplemental Liquidity Providers” or SLPs) illustrates the 
difficulty of using the old regulatory categories in the new world of 
digital markets. A related concern is the health of the trading 
“ecosystem” in this new world, specifically the diversity of players 
in the system and the decline in the numbers of various players, 
particularly broker-dealers. 
In the NYSE’s specialist system, specialists were granted the 
right to see the order book in a particular stock.52 While they were 
not supposed to trade on it, it is hard to believe that this information 
did not constitute a valuable advantage in their market-making 
activities.53 In exchange for advance knowledge of the order book 
in the stocks it covered, the specialist assumed the obligation to 
make a market in times of market stress, to be willing to buy those 
stocks when investors would flee, and to sell when they all wanted 
to buy. Specialists were therefore charged with standing on the 
opposite side of the market from the general direction of the herd. 
Economically, the positional advantages of being a specialist 
appear to have more than compensated them for this role, and the 
specialist system endured until the NYSE was thoroughly domi-
nated by electronic traders.54 The specialist system at the NYSE was 
phased out in 2008 and replaced with the new category of 
“Designated Market Maker.”55 
Since then, the market has struggled to find the appropriate 
balance of positional advantage and affirmative obligations for 
DMMs. The signal event in this quest was the “Flash Crash” of 
 
 52. See generally HARRIS, supra note 6, at 494–513; JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFOR-
MATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND 
MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 335–44 (3d ed. 2003). 
 53. See CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY 223 (1997); see also Stanislav 
Dolgopolov, Regulating Merchants of Liquidity: Market Making from Crowded Floors to High-
Frequency Trading, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 651, 667–68 (2016) (describing both the privileges and 
obligations of market makers in the pre-Regulation NMS era); Hans R. Stoll, Electronic 
Trading in Stock Markets, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 153, 158–59 (2006) (detailing enforcement actions 
against specialists abusing their privileges). 
 54. See Dolgopolov, supra note 53, at 662–67 (analyzing the economic forces affecting 
the provision of liquidity in a specialist system). 
 55. See Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change to Create a New NYSE Market 
Model, Exchange Act Release No. 34-58845, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,379 passim (Oct. 24, 2008); see also 
Evangelos Benos & Anne Wetherilt, The Role of Designated Market Makers in the New Trading 
Landscape, 2012(Q4) BANK OF ENG. Q. BULL. 343 (2012). 
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May 6, 2010, when the stock market lost over a trillion dollars in 
approximately thirty-six minutes.56 Subsequent smaller crashes 
have also occurred.57 These sudden crashes reveal the susceptibility 
of the stock markets to large and sudden swings in prices. The 
failure demonstrated here is that the predominant liquidity 
providers in the current market, high-frequency traders, are 
skittish, cancelling their quotes and exiting as soon as they detect a 
whiff of market instability. From their point of view, such behavior 
is necessary in order to protect against standing on the wrong side 
of the market and suffering significant losses.58 From the 
perspective of the market as a whole, the provision of liquidity by 
electronic traders lacks the incentives of the old specialist system, 
which tended to mitigate market swings. This has led to complaints 
about “phantom liquidity,” liquidity that appears on the order 
books of the exchanges but is liable to vanish at the first signs 
of stress.59 
In the current system, the DMMs and SLPs should function as 
a backstop of liquidity provision when high-frequency traders 
withdraw from the market. In the Flash Crash and many smaller 
“mini flash crashes,” they do not appear to have taken up this role. 
The current system at the NYSE, as well as many other exchanges, 
relies on DMMs to support trading by offering them certain 
benefits, but not an advance look at trades coming into the stock 
 
 56. See COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FINDINGS 
REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010 (2010) [hereinafter CFTC & SEC FINDINGS]. 
 57. See Maureen Farrell, Mini Flash Crashes: A Dozen a Day, CNN MONEY (Mar. 20, 
2013, 1:56 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2013/03/20/investing/mini-flash-crash/. 
 58. See, e.g., CFTC & SEC FINDINGS, supra note 56, at 48 (“In general . . . it appears that 
the 17 HFT firms traded with the price trend on May 6 and, on both an absolute and net basis, 
removed significant buy liquidity from the public quoting markets during the downturn.”). 
 59. See, e.g., The Cost of Phantom Liquidity, THEMIS TRADING BLOG (Aug. 14, 2012), 
http://blog.themistrading.com/2012/08/the-cost-of-phantom-liquidity/; see also Graham 
Partington, Richard Philip & Amy Kwan, Is High Frequency Trading Beneficial to Market 
Quality? (Ctr. Int’l Fin. & Regulation, Working Paper No. 083, 2015) (arguing that HFTs, more 
often than not, supply liquidity on the “thick” side of the book where it is needed least). But 
see Jesse Blocher, Rick Cooper, Jonathan Seddon & Ben Van Vliet, Phantom Liquidity and High 
Frequency Quoting, 11 J. TRADING 6 (2016) (analyzing NASDAQ data to argue that “phantom 
liquidity” is merely HFT firms continually adjusting their quotes); Avanidhar Subra-
hmanyam & Hui Zheng, Limit Order Placement by High-Frequency Traders, 16 BORSA ISTANBUL 
REV. 185, 205 (2016) (finding that HFT increases liquidity provision in times of 
high volatility). 
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exchange.60 Instead, DMMs can trade at parity with those orders 
but are provided special quoting and fee rebates, particularly for 
less active securities.61 These incentives do not always appear to 
have been enough to prompt them to step into the breach.62 The 
root cause of the problem appears to be the very unforgiving and 
tightly coupled environment created by algorithmic trading and 
low latency times. Any disadvantageous position will be quickly 
and ruthlessly converted into a gain by a trader on the opposite side 
of the market. In the old system, with broker-dealers on the floor of 
an exchange, a specialist could stand by a position and, presum-
ably, other traders would trade against it. The limited number of 
traders on the floor and the timing gaps between outside infor-
mation reaching floor traders, however, seem to have provided a 
natural limit to how much a liquidity-providing stance could be 
exploited. This in turn lent a certain measure of “stickiness” to the 
market. In a digital environment, these natural limits are greatly 
lessened, if not eliminated entirely. Digital markets challenge the 
assumption that market makers have sufficient incentive to supply 
liquidity in all market conditions. 
E. The Stock Exchanges Are Properly Positioned to Be 
Self-Regulatory Organizations 
A fifth assumption under considerable strain is that the ex-
changes are properly positioned to be self-regulatory organizations 
(SROs). While the factors undermining this role are complex, and 
not entirely attributable to technological change, the complaint that 
 
 60. In the current electronic market, an advance look at the limit order book wouldn’t 
even make sense. Nowadays, traders purchasing proprietary data feeds have knowledge of 
such orders as soon as they come into the exchange and can act on these orders or modify 
their own orders based on this information. In the old specialist system, the specialists were 
the only participants with such knowledge. See Terrence Hendershott & Pamela C. Moulton, 
Automation, Speed, and Stock Market Quality: The NYSE’s Hybrid, 14 J. FIN. MARKETS 568, 570–
71 (2011). 
 61. See Benos & Wetherilt, supra note 55; Designated Market Makers, NYSE (2018), 
https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/listing/fact_sheet_dmm.pdf. 
 62. See JOINT CFTC-SEC ADVISORY COMM. ON EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES, 
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING REGULATORY RESPONSES TO THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 
2010, at 10 (2011), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/sec-cftcjointcommittee/021811-report.pdf. 
But see Adam D. Clark-Joseph, Mao Ye & Chao Zi, Designated Market Makers Still Matter: 
Evidence from Two Natural Experiments, 126 J. FIN. ECON. 652 (2017). 
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the exchanges privilege their best customers at the expense of 
others goes to the heart of the problems with the current system. 
The SRO system envisioned in the Exchange Act, as well as the 1975 
Amendments, and even Regulation NMS, springs from the world 
of open outcry trading with trading rooms, specialists, and floor 
brokers, as well as off-exchange traders. 
The 1934 Act classifies any “national securities exchange” as an 
SRO.63 An SRO, in turn, is tasked with enforcing compliance with 
the 1934 Act and its regulations, as well as the exchange’s own rules 
among its members.64 Section 6(b)(5) outlines the objectives an ex-
change’s rules must advance: 
 The rules of the exchange are designed to prevent fraudulent 
and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and 
equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation and coordi-
nation with persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling, 
processing information with respect to, and facilitating trans-
actions in securities, to remove impediments to and perfect the 
mechanism of a free and open market and a national market 
system, and, in general, to protect investors and the public 
interest; and are not designed to permit unfair discrimination 
between customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers, or to regulate by 
virtue of any authority conferred by this title matters not related 
to the purposes of this title or the administration of 
the exchange.65 
These more general goals of the SRO system made sense in 
terms of the trading environment of the time. Exchanges were 
cooperative institutions originally formed by the stockbrokers 
themselves, and up until the 1990s, and 2006 in the case of the 
NYSE, remained member-owned institutions. Most importantly, a 
stock exchange possessed significant market power, if not outright 
monopoly, either in its geographical region or with respect to the 
particular securities traded on it.66 This market power gave it great 
authority over its members, as the threat of enforcement and 
 
 63. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(26), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (2012). 
 64. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(3)(A). 
 65. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5). 
 66. See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Demythologizing the Stock Exchange: Reconciling Self-
Regulation and the National Market System, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1069, 1091 (2005). 
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ultimately expulsion could deprive a member of lucrative trad-
ing privileges. 
The shift from cooperative ownership to the demutualized, 
corporate stock exchange fundamentally upset this balance. While 
there were numerous instances of exchanges failing to properly po-
lice their members in the pre-corporate era67 (with the resultant 
harms falling on the investing public), the interests of the owners 
in a cooperative exchange are aligned with those of its primary 
customers, the broker-dealers, since these are the same parties.68 A 
cooperative exchange possessing market power, whose option of 
expulsion amounted to a significant threat that the exchange could 
exercise with little harm to itself, would have an interest in 
regulating its members for the larger success of the en-
tire cooperative.69 
In the case of a corporate exchange, however, the interests of 
the owners and the customers are not aligned. Here, the 
stockholders will only favor actions that contribute directly to 
profitability, while the brokers will be mainly interested in paying 
as low a fee as possible.70 The expense of regulation will come to 
seem a cost that contributes to neither party’s immediate goals, and 
any longer-term benefit to a strong regulatory function may seem 
too remote to motivate significant devotion of time and resources. 
Compounding the effects of demutualization is Regulation NMS, 
which sets the exchanges in direct competition with one another for 
order flow. Now, the exchanges are incentivized to cater to their 
customers, particularly their best ones, the high-frequency traders, 
not to enforce irksome discipline. In this environment, regulation 
amounts to a public good that all financial market participants 
benefit from, but no one exchange wants to fund.71 Individual 
exchanges are therefore tempted to free-ride on the regulatory 
efforts of others, partaking in the general benefits of strong 
 
 67. See, e.g., SELIGMAN, supra note 52, at 335–44. 
 68. See Andreas M. Fleckner, Stock Exchanges at the Crossroads, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2541, 2591 (2006). 
 69. See David S. Evans, Governing Bad Behavior by Users of Multi-sided Platforms, 27 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1201, 1231–35 (2012) [hereinafter Evans, Governing Bad Behavior]. 
 70. See Yesha Yadav, The Failure of Liability in Modern Markets, 102 VA. L. REV. 1031, 
1091–92 (2016). 
 71. See Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, From Markets to Venues: Securities 
Regulation in an Evolving World, 58 STAN. L. REV. 563, 576 (2005). 
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regulatory enforcement while shirking the responsibility of paying 
for it. In this new environment, the stiff competition for order flow 
operates in conjunction with the demutualized, corporate status of 
the exchanges to place regulatory efforts on the back burner. 
The desperate competition for order flow in fact explains why 
the exchanges have been accused of privileging high-frequency 
traders. In the analysis of David Evans, a multi-sided platform, 
which the stock exchange is, requires the ability to exclude parties 
that violate the platform’s code of conduct.72 A properly func-
tioning platform has an incentive to police bad behavior, because 
doing so will increase the total value of the platform to its users as 
well as the profits to its owners. In the present environment, the 
lack of market power of any one exchange means that high-volume 
customers are so valuable that exchanges are tempted to cater to 
them at the expense of their other, less technologically sophisticated 
ones. There is evidence to support this admittedly strong assertion. 
In 2015, the BATS exchange paid a $14 million fine to settle an SEC 
enforcement action that the Direct Edge exchange had selectively 
disclosed how its “Hide Not Slide” order type functions.73 The 
allegation was that BATS had informed high-frequency traders of 
the details regarding the functionality of the Hide Not Slide order 
but kept them from other market participants. Trader Haim Bodek 
further alleged that many of the complicated “special order types” 
are in fact developed by the exchanges working directly with HFT 
firms, and their complexity and arguably unfair functionalities, 
such as queue-jumping features, enable HFT firms to profit at the 
expense of other traders.74 On a more general level, the devel-
opment of co-location services and enriched data feeds, both used 
by HFT firms to gain speed and informational advantages, creates 
a two-tiered marketplace in which one set of traders profits at 
another’s expense. Indeed, a number of commentators have 
 
 72. See Evans, Governing Bad Behavior, supra note 69, at 1220. 
 73. See Bradley Hope, BATS to Pay $14 Million to Settle Direct Edge Order-Type Case, 
WALL STREET J. (Jan. 12, 2015, 6:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/direct-edge-ex 
changes-to-pay-14-million-penalty-over-order-type-descriptions-1421082603. 
 74. See Haim Bodek, Locked Markets, Priority and Why HFTs Have an Advantage: Part 2: 
Hide & Light, TABBFORUM (Oct. 16, 2012), https://tabbforum.com/opinions/locked-markets 
-priority-and-why-hfts-have-an-advantage-part-2-hide-and-light; see also PATTERSON, supra 
note 21, at 204–05. 
 
001.MCNAMARA_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/4/19  4:30 PM 
969 The Stock Exchange as Multi-sided Platform 
 991 
characterized the profits made in this manner as a tax or rent on long- 
term investors, calling into question the ultimate social utility of 
high-frequency trading that relies solely on positional advantage.75 
From the perspective of the exchanges, however, it is necessary 
to cater to their most important customers. The corresponding 
failure of the exchanges as SROs is that they then permit and even 
profit from “unfair discrimination between customers,” in the 
language of Exchange Act section 6(b)(5).76 While this failure is not 
the exclusive result of technological change, the development of  
HFT in an environment of corporate exchanges set into direct com-
petition with one another casts doubt on the assumption that the 
exchanges can properly function as SROs in the manner the 
Exchange Act intends. 
The failure of these five assumptions shows the increasing 
tension between Regulation NMS and the digital stock markets it 
must now govern. With its origins in the Securities Acts Amend-
ments of 1975, Regulation NMS was formulated for an earlier age. 
While it is neither an unalloyed success nor a complete failure, its 
emphasis on setting the exchanges into competition with one 
another faces considerable challenges for the future. The nature of 
the stock exchange as a platform business, and how platforms 
appear to operate in the digital environment, encapsulates 
these challenges. 
II. THE STOCK EXCHANGE AS DIGITAL MULTI-SIDED PLATFORM 
What type of business is exchange trading, and how might this 
affect the project of revamping the regulatory structure of the 
national market system? The stock exchange is fundamentally a 
multi-sided platform, a business through which disparate groups 
come together to transact. The literature on MSPs illuminates a 
 
 75. See Fox et al., supra note 29, at 241–44; Albert S. Kyle & Jeongmin Lee, Toward a 
Fully Continuous Exchange, 33 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 650, 651 (2017) (“The discreteness of 
today’s market design creates rents for traders who have invested in costly superior 
technology.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., High Frequency Trading Reform: The Short Term and the Longer 
Term, COLUM. L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG (July 21, 2014), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia 
.edu/2014/07/21/high-frequency-trading-reform-the-short-term-and-the-longer-term/; see 
also Yesha Yadav, Insider Trading and Market Structure, 63 UCLA L. REV. 968, 971 (2016) (“[T]he 
design of modern automated markets departs from past practice by expressly giving 
meaningful informational advantages to select, high-speed algorithmic traders.”). 
 76. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (2012). 
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number of the key features of stock markets both in their traditional 
and digital forms. The stock exchange as MSP is also crucial to the 
debate surrounding the pricing of exchange services through 
“maker-taker” rebates, as well as governance in the exchange space 
in the coming decades. Part II surveys the MSP literature and then 
looks at the current fragmented markets with a view to how the 
exchanges reflect the usual economic characteristics of MSPs. The 
stock exchange is a unique type of MSP, bearing some but not all of 
its typical characteristics. 
Part II argues for the following propositions: (1) The stock 
exchange itself is an MSP, and the debate over pricing for its 
services should acknowledge this. Proposals to ban “maker-taker” 
rebates therefore are in considerable tension with the underlying 
economics of the digital stock exchange. (2) Exchange trading, both 
in its pre-digital and current forms, is affected by strong centripetal 
forces that tend to concentrate trading on one venue or a small 
number of venues. Indeed, some economists have viewed financial 
exchanges as natural monopolies. (3) Regulation NMS disrupts the 
natural operation of the liquidity network effect. While customers 
have benefited from the increased competition among the ex-
changes, which has driven down costs, a corollary of increased 
competition is the reduced incentive for exchanges to function 
effectively as SROs, as discussed above. (4) As competition has re-
duced the ability of exchanges to derive revenue from the provision 
of trading services, they have increasingly become data-provision 
businesses. Disputes surrounding data pricing have therefore come 
to the fore in recent years, particularly with the ongoing 
NetCoalition litigation.77 While the conventional economic view is 
that each stock exchange functions as an individual MSP, to the 
extent that they may be acting in concert regarding data pricing, the 
exchanges begin to look like a collection of nodes that constitute a 
single super-MSP. Of course, it is just this question of monopoly, or 
rather, oligopoly, that is at issue in NetCoalition. The question of 
whether exchange trading really is a natural monopoly, as many 
economists suggest, and what an appropriate regulatory response 
might be, introduces Part III. 
 
 77. See NetCoalition v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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A. The Economics of the Stock Exchange 
1. Why trade on an exchange? 
It is common to see businesses of one type cluster together. In 
New York City, think of the theater district, the diamond district, 
the Fulton fish market, or Wall Street. In the case of a marketplace 
or souk, having a number of vendors selling similar goods in one 
place is beneficial for both buyers and sellers. Buyers can survey 
the different product offerings side by side and negotiate amongst 
the various sellers to find the one offering the best deal. Conversely, 
sellers “want to be where the action is,” benefitting from the 
increased traffic generated by many buyers. Buyers and sellers thus 
interact in a way that creates a feedback loop, where more sellers 
attract more buyers, and vice versa.78 Search costs are lowered for 
all by congregating trade in one location. 
Trading in stocks also tends to converge on a single venue. 
Financial economists have built various models that provide a 
formal explanation why this is so.79 The model of Marco Pagano 
divides traders into two classes, large traders interested in liquidity 
and speculators.80 Liquidity traders such as institutional investors 
will need to sell an asset at a certain time. To obtain the best price, 
they seek the market that can absorb their order with the least 
amount of adverse effect on the price they will be offered, i.e., the 
most liquid market. While speculators are primarily interested in 
volatility, which offers the possibility of buying low and selling 
high, they are also attracted to the market with the greatest volume 
of trade because it offers the most potential matches. A feedback 
loop thus arises between liquidity traders and speculators.81 The 
 
 78. See generally Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, Lessons About Markets from the 
Internet, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 139, 142–43 (2005) (discussing agglomeration of trade in a variety 
of businesses including stock exchanges). 
 79. See, e.g., Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, A Theory of Intraday Patterns: Volume 
and Price Variability, 1 REV. FIN. STUD. 3 (1988); Marco Pagano, Trading Volume and Asset 
Liquidity, 104 Q.J. ECON. 255 (1989); Craig Pirrong, A Theory of Financial Exchange Organization, 
43 J.L. & ECON. 437 (2000) [hereinafter Pirrong, A Theory]; Craig Pirrong, The Organization of 
Financial Exchange Markets: Theory and Evidence, 2 J. FIN. MKTS. 329 (1999) [hereinafter Pirrong, 
Organization of Financial Exchange Markets]; Lester G. Telser, Why There Are Organized Futures 
Markets, 24 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1981). 
 80. See Pagano, supra note 79, at 255–57. 
 81. Id. at 256. 
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model of Pagano shows that, under stylized conditions, including 
that trade is costless, trade will converge on a single market.82 
Complementing Pagano’s model is that of Anat Admati and Paul 
Pfleiderer, which explains why trade in specific stocks tends to 
congregate at various times of the day, such as the periods 
immediately after the market opens and just before its close.83 In 
their model, liquidity traders want to trade when they believe the 
market will be thickest, thus attracting informed traders as well.84 
These models therefore provide a theoretical explanation for the 
congregation of trade on specific markets and at specific times. 
They also imply that, in the simplest situation, trading in 
financial instruments is a natural monopoly.85 This corresponds to 
the commonly observed phenomenon that trading in a particular 
stock or financial instrument tends to cluster in one location or 
venue. While regulation at either the stock exchange level, such as 
former NYSE Rule 390, or at the level of the market as a whole, such 
as the Order Protection Rule of Regulation NMS, can encourage or 
discourage such clustering, the models imply that in the abstract 
world of financial theory, exchange trading is a natural monopoly. 
Perhaps more intuitively, a number of important economists have 
viewed a single exchange as in principle the most efficient arrange-
ment for securities trading.86 The models account for fragmentation 
of trading as well. According to Pagano, where transaction costs 
differ in markets, and large traders fear adverse price changes, they 
 
 82. Id. at 262. 
 83. See Admati & Pfleiderer, supra note 79. 
 84. Id. at 5. 
 85. See id. at 33 (“In equilibrium, discretionary . . . trading is typically concentrated. . . . 
[, and i]nformed traders trade more actively in periods when liquidity trading is 
concentrated.”); Pagano, supra note 79, at 262 (“Thus, if trade is costless (or equally costly), 
all traders tend to concentrate on a single market.”); Pirrong, Organization of Financial 
Exchange Markets, supra note 79, at 330 (“[T]rading of particular financial instruments exhibits 
strong natural monopoly characteristics . . . .”). 
 86. See, e.g., Fischer Black, Toward a Fully Automated Stock Exchange, FIN. ANALYSTS J., 
July–Aug. 1971, at 28, 29 (“It appears that the market for a single stock is most efficient if all 
orders for the stock come in to a single point, so that all potential buyers can be exposed to 
all sell orders, and all potential sellers can be exposed to all buy orders.”); George J. Stigler, 
Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. BUS. 117, 129 (1964) (“The greater the number 
of transactions in a security concentrated in one exchange, the smaller the discontinuities in 
trading and the smaller the necessary inventories of securities. As a result the price of a 
security will almost invariably be ‘made’ in one exchange.”); see also Lawrence R. Glosten, Is 
the Electronic Open Limit Order Book Inevitable?, 49 J. FIN. 1127 (1994). 
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will trade on the market (or search off-exchange) with higher 
transaction costs.87 Pagano provides the example of off-exchange 
trading in the Italian stock market; another example would be the 
“upstairs” market at the NYSE, which was the precursor to today’s 
dark pools. Fragmentation therefore occurs when the combination 
of transaction costs and different sizes of pools of liquidity make it 
advantageous for some traders to turn to a second market or to 
individualized search. 
A final theoretical observation to note is Craig Pirrong’s argu-
ment that natural monopoly can coexist with supra-competitive 
profits in the world of member-owned financial exchanges.88 By 
restricting their numbers, the members of a cooperative exchange 
will increase each individual seat holder’s return. The cost of 
competing with the exchange however may prevent a competitor 
from arising: “Under plausible conditions, exchanges have enough 
members to make it unprofitable for competing exchanges to form, 
but fewer members than is socially optimal.”89 Pirrong surveys the 
prices for seats on various financial exchanges, finding evidence 
that the exchanges had done exactly that.90 Of course, the major 
impetus for Regulation NMS was to reduce the monopoly profits 
of the NYSE members. While the solution has led to problems of its 
own, which are the subject of this Article, it is important to 
remember the original problem it was intended to deal with: 
monopoly rents accruing to members in the form of high trans-
action costs. 
 
 87. See Pagano, supra note 79, at 256. 
 88. See Pirrong, Organization of Financial Exchange Markets, supra note 79, at 339. 
 89. Id. at 330. 
 90. Id. at 349–53. Pirrong uses the measure “Tobin’s q,” defined as “the ratio of the 
market price of financial claims outstanding against a firm to the replacement value of the 
firm’s assets,” to investigate whether the price of seats on an exchange capitalizes economic 
rents. In a perfectly competitive industry, with no barriers to entry, Tobin’s q should be 1.00. 
Looking at the prices for seats on the Chicago Board of Trade; the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange; the New York Cotton Exchange; the Coffee, Sugar, and Cocoa Exchange; the New 
York Stock Exchange; and the Chicago Board Options Exchange, Pirrong finds that the q ratio 
in each case exceeded 1.00 and was typically above 2.00. The q ratio for the NYSE ranged 
from a high of 4.05 in 1987 to a low of 1.25 in 1991. These Tobin’s q ratios thus provide 
evidence that the profits earned by exchange members constitute economic rents generated 
by restricting membership. 
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2. Multi-sided platforms 
Over the past fifteen years economists have begun to study 
platform businesses or “multi-sided platforms.”91 MSPs are busi-
nesses that mediate between two or more groups of customers. A 
crucial swath of businesses in the economy perform this function in 
many different ways—commonly cited examples include recent 
digital platforms such as Amazon, Uber, and the like, but pre-
digital examples include credit cards, shopping malls, financial 
exchanges, and even newspapers. While there are many types of 
MSPs, any business that allows for the direct interaction of two or 
more disparate groups of consumers has features of a multi-sided 
platform.92 Financial exchanges have long been recognized as an 
important type of MSP, although there has been little specific study 
of them as a particular type of MSP.93 
MSPs are businesses that exhibit strong “indirect network 
effects.” This means that users on one side of the platform are 
attracted to, and benefit from, a large number of users on the other 
side.94 In the case of a shopping mall, individuals shopping for new 
clothes will be attracted to a mall with many clothing retailers. 
Likewise, investors looking to buy stock on a stock exchange will 
 
 91. While many papers, including those of Rochet & Tirole, refer to “two-sided 
markets,” the term “multi-sided platforms” seems more appropriate because many of these 
markets have a multiplicity of customers. Stock exchanges, for example, cater not only to 
buyers and sellers of securities but to issuers; there are also purchasers of market data, who 
may or may not be buyers and sellers. The platform itself is also important. For 
terminological discussion, see Ellison & Ellison, supra note 78, at 146; David S. Evans, 
Antitrust Issues Raised by the Emerging Global Internet Economy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1987, 1994 
n.31 (2008) [hereinafter Evans, Antitrust Issues]; Andrei Hagiu & Julian Wright, Multi-sided 
Platforms, 43 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 162 (2015); Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided 
Markets: A Progress Report, 37 RAND J. ECON. 645, 645 n.1 (2006) [hereinafter Rochet & Tirole, 
Two-Sided Markets]. 
 92. See Andrei Hagiu, Multi-sided Platforms: From Microfoundations to Design and Expan-
sion Strategies (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 07-094, 2006); Jean-Charles Rochet & 
Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 990 (2003) [here-
inafter Rochet & Tirole, Platform Competition]. 
 93. See Jose Miguel M. Abito, A Two-Sided Market Analysis of Stock Exchanges (2006) 
(unpublished Honours B.Soc.Sci. thesis, National University of Singapore); see also Michael 
Castelle, The Platform as Exchange: Financial Metaphors for the Regulation of Marketplace 
Platforms, OXFORD INTERNET INST. IPP2016, at 10 (2016); Evans, Antitrust Issues, supra note 91, 
at 1996; Evans, Governing Bad Behavior, supra note 69, at 1231–35; Jonathan D. Levin, The Eco-
nomics of Internet Markets (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16852, 2011). 
 94. See Hagiu, supra note 92, at 3; see generally Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems 
Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 97–98 (1994). 
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be attracted to an exchange with a large number of sellers posting 
offers. The hallmark of an MSP is the operation of indirect network 
effects whereby a group on one “side” of the platform is affected by 
the number of users on the other side. (Direct network effects on 
the other hand are where customers are affected by the number of 
users on the same side—for example, a person signs up for tele-
phone service because many others have signed up as well, and it 
will be easy to communicate with them.95) 
The economics literature specifies the essence of an MSP more 
precisely, however. In the pioneering articles of Jean-Charles 
Rochet and Jean Tirole, the defining characteristic of an MSP is that 
the total amount of activity conducted on the platform is affected 
not just by the total price charged for the service but by the 
breakdown of fees allocated to each side. According to Rochet and 
Tirole, “a two-sided market [is] one in which the volume of 
transactions between end-users depends on the structure and not 
only on the overall level of the fees charged by the platform.”96 This 
specification is crucial for the economics of MSPs and illuminates 
many commonly observed phenomena surrounding platforms. For 
example, why do most large American cities have a weekly 
newspaper distributed free of charge to commuters? Why do bars 
often host a “ladies’ night” where women are charged half price for 
drinks? In the analysis offered by the MSP literature, these pricing 
strategies make sense in that they increase the volume of 
participants on one side of the market to a level that will cause the 
overall value created by the platform to increase.97 As Rochet and 
Tirole note, these differences in pricing often lead to disputes about 
whether a group is being charged too much—as we see in the 
disputes over fees and rebates at the stock exchanges.98 In the 
 
 95. See Evans, Antitrust Issues, supra note 91, at 1993 n.27. 
 96. Rochet & Tirole, Two-Sided Markets, supra note 91, at 646; see also Rochet & Tirole, 
Platform Competition, supra note 92, at 1018 (“[T]he volume of transactions on and the profit 
of a platform depend not only on the total price charged to the parties to the transaction, but 
also on its decomposition.”). 
 97. See David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Free, 7 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 71, 
75 (2011). 
 98. See David S. Evans, Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-sided Platform Industries, 2 REV. 
NETWORK ECON. 191, 193–97 (2003) (“Optimal prices are not proportional to marginal 
costs . . . .”) [hereinafter Evans, Some Empirical Aspects]; Rochet & Tirole, Platform Competition, 
supra note 92, at 1018–19; see also infra Section II.B.3.a (“Maker-taker pricing”). 
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examples above, MSPs function as matchmakers that operate to 
reduce search costs for disparate groups of users.99 In the language 
of economics, the positive externalities of the MSP are “inter-
nalized” by the network in the form of lower search costs.100 The 
platform has a valuable role to play by offering much lower search 
costs to participants than the available alternatives. 
A second important feature of MSPs is that they often lower 
search costs by certifying or monitoring participants on one or 
multiple sides of the platform.101 An example would be seller 
certifications on Amazon.com, where sellers of books or other 
products are rated as to their reliability, or Airbnb.com, where hosts 
are rated as to their service levels. On the stock exchange, these 
certifications have long been important—a broker holding a seat on 
the NYSE, or an NASD (now FINRA) member trading on 
NASDAQ, possessed an important qualification.102 Furthermore, 
this certification was connected to an important set of rules that 
policed conduct on the exchange, providing a guarantee (not 
always realized, of course) to customers of legal and ethical conduct 
by stockbrokers. While it is questionable whether the exchanges are 
presently incentivized to police their members’ conduct, this 
traditionally has been an important aspect of the stock exchange’s 
role as an MSP.103 
A final point to note is the distinction between “multi-homing” 
and “single-homing.”104 Multi-homing is where one side to the 
exchange can easily use competing networks, such as a consumer 
who carries both Mastercard and American Express credit cards. 
Single-homing, on the other hand, is where it is only feasible for a 
 
 99. The matchmaker role played by MSPs reflects the fact that they solve bargaining 
problems between parties in situations in which the Coase theorem does not apply. See 
Evans, Governing Bad Behavior, supra note 69, at 1203; Rochet & Tirole, Two-Sided Markets, 
supra note 91, at 649. 
 100. See Evans, Some Empirical Aspects, supra note 98, at 192–93. 
 101. See Hagiu, supra note 92, at 5–6, 15; Evans, Governing Bad Behavior, supra note 69, at 
1218–26. 
 102. See Lofchie, supra note 25. 
 103. See Yesha Yadav, Oversight Failure in Securities Markets, CORNELL L. REV. (forth-
coming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2754786; Lofchie, supra 
note 25. 
 104. See Mark Armstrong, Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 37 RAND J. ECON. 668,  
669–70 (2006); Rochet & Tirole, Two-Sided Markets, supra note 91, at 659–60. 
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group of users to use one network: issuers listing their stock on a 
particular exchange, or shoppers in a regional city with only one 
shopping mall, would be single-homing. The importance of single-
homing is that in cases where all users must single-home, the 
network looks like a utility-type situation where monopoly is often 
the most efficient structure.105 In the case of a stock exchange, how-
ever, buyers and sellers don’t have to single-home, and they 
typically multi-home by monitoring prices on many venues and 
consummating a transaction on the one displaying the most 
favorable price. As discussed further below, the stock exchanges 
have a complex institutional landscape with some but not all 
features of classic MSPs. While issuers (typically but not always) 
single-home, the other groups of exchange customers typi-
cally multi-home. 
3. The effects of digitization 
As the examples of Amazon, Microsoft, Airbnb, Expedia, Uber, 
and others indicate, MSPs are rapidly increasing in importance as 
information technology and the internet develop.106 Many of the 
most important businesses in the world right now are MSPs, and 
most established industries are in various, often near-complete, 
stages of transformation due to the digitization of commercial life. 
Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter have essentially created the 
entirely new industry of social media, while Amazon has 
transformed the preexisting retail sales industry. At the opposite 
end of the spectrum from social media—largely a new creation—
are the stock exchanges. While the transformation of financial 
markets is thoroughgoing, it is the result of the application of 
computer technology to a highly detailed, preexisting business and 
regulatory framework, not the creation of an entirely new busi-
ness.107 As Part I above explores, digitization creates significant 
 
 105. See Armstrong, supra note 104, at 670 (“[W]here all users must single-home. . . . the 
efficient outcome is for all agents to use the same platform.”). 
 106. See Hagiu, supra note 93, at 2; Günter Knieps & Johannes M. Bauer, The Industrial 
Organization of the Internet, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNET 23, 31–32 
(Johannes M. Bauer & Michael Latzer eds., 2016). 
 107. See Castelle, supra note 93 (arguing that regulators grappling with the “emergent 
organizational and regulatory complexities” of MSPs should draw on the example of secu-
rities regulation, which has gradually encompassed electronic stock exchanges). 
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tension within this framework, and key assumptions no longer 
hold good. Nevertheless, the application of advanced computer 
technology does not have the same character as in other industries 
which have been newly created out of the whole cloth of the 
internet, such as social media, or just radically transformed by it, 
such as retail. While the “death of distance” and increasing returns 
to scale enabled by the internet have radically transformed many 
traditional businesses,108 their effect on the financial exchanges 
appears less profound. The preexisting business and regulatory 
structure already enabled a high degree of connection with 
investors not present at an exchange through brokers holding seats 
there, and an infrastructure that could handle a substantial volume, 
and increase in volume, of transactions. 
The transformation of the exchanges by advanced information 
technology may be more subtle than in other industries, then. 
Nevertheless, its effects are significant. First, with the digitization 
of financial markets has come a decreasing need for various 
categories of financial intermediaries. Information technology fuels 
disintermediation here because there is less of a role for specialized 
parties in electronic stock markets.109 The “death of the specialist” 
on the NYSE is the most obvious example of this: no longer do we 
need specialists in each listed stock to act as matchmakers on the 
trading floor.110 The death of the specialist really traces back to 
NASDAQ’s quote-driven market, which operated with broker-
dealers communicating with one another telephonically, unlike the 
open outcry auction market at the NYSE.111 In addition to dispens-
ing with the specialists, the current market is disintermediating 
further, with a steep decline in the number of broker-dealers in 
 
 108. See Justus Haucap & Torben Stühmeier, Competition and Antitrust in Internet 
Markets, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNET 183, 184–88 (Johannes M. Bauer 
& Michael Latzer eds., 2016); Knieps & Bauer, supra note 106, at 24. 
 109. See generally Brummer, supra note 7, at 1024–31; ONNIG H. DOMBALAGIAN, 
CHASING THE TAPE: INFORMATION LAW AND POLICY IN CAPITAL MARKETS 182 (2015); see also 
Fischer Black, Toward a Fully Automated Stock Exchange, Part II, 27 FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov.–Dec. 
1971, at 24, 86–87. 
 110. See Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Demise of 
Exchange Trading Floors and the Growth of ECNs, 33 J. CORP. L. 865, 897–900 (2008). 
 111. See Stoll, supra note 53, at 159–60. 
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recent years.112 With more and more retail investing going through 
online brokerages such as E-Trade and Charles Schwab, there is less 
business for the local, smaller brokerage houses. As Pirrong noted 
in 2000, computer-driven markets drive disintermediation, and the 
development of the markets since then illustrates this.113 
A second effect of digitization is the rapid development and 
application of special order types. Throughout most of the history 
of the exchanges, orders came in two basic forms: a limit order, 
which was a standing order to buy or sell a certain number of shares 
at a fixed price, and a market order, which was an immediate order 
to buy or sell a certain number of shares at the current market 
price.114 As the exchanges digitized, becoming essentially compli-
cated, rule-based matching engines housed in computer servers,115 
it became much easier to develop and apply complicated and 
specialized order types. Now orders such as Midpoint Immediate 
or Cancel, Adding Liquidity Only Limit, Day ISO (Intermarket 
Sweep Order), Non-Displayed Limit, and various types of auction 
orders, activated at the open or close of trading, are offered by the 
exchanges.116 Many of the special order types developed in recent 
years are designed to take advantage of, or guard against, various 
local conditions in the electronic markets.117 The development of 
complex order types is an example of the innovation and 
customization available to operators of online, algorithmic busi-
nesses.118 It also reflects the fact that digitization allows for vastly 
 
 112. See Hester Pierce, Dwindling Numbers in the Financial Industry, BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTION (May 15, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/dwindling-number 
s-in-the-financial-industry/ (detailing a decline of 5892 broker-dealers registered with the 
SEC in 2007 to 3989 in 2017); see also Richard Johnson, Brokers Adapt to Shrinking Equity 
Commissions, GREENWICH ASSOCIATES (July 27, 2017), https://www.greenwich.com/equities 
/brokers-adapt-shrinking-equity-commissions. 
 113. See Pirrong, A Theory, supra note 79, at 460. 
 114. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 115. See Paul G. Mahoney & Gabriel Rauterberg, The Regulation of Trading Markets: A 
Survey and Evaluation 4 (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper Series 
No. 2017-07, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2955112 (“It is tempting to think of a stock 
market as a facility, physical or virtual, but it is better described as a set of rules and 
procedures pursuant to which investors buy and sell securities.”). 
 116. See, e.g., NYSE Rule 13 (2018) (listing and defining various order types). 
 117. See ALDRIDGE, supra note 46, at 44–45; Morelli, supra note 26. 
 118. See Levin, supra note 93, at 11. 
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increased information flows.119 The panoply of sophisticated order 
types both requires a great amount of data to function, and in turn 
produces a great amount of data available for use, at a price, by 
financial markets participants at large. 
Finally, the development of the internet has allowed new en-
trants to compete against established players.120 This is true of the 
stock exchanges, although after the rush to compete against the 
NYSE in the wake of Regulation NMS, it appears that the opposite 
has been true, and the markets have settled into a stable allocation 
of market share among a few major players.121 In 2005, the NYSE 
was still a monopoly exchange, handling approximately 80% of the 
trading in NYSE-listed shares. A number of new entrants quickly 
arose, including BATS and Direct Edge, and the NASDAQ en-
croached on the NYSE as well. After a few years of growth, a wave 
of consolidation occurred, with BATS acquiring the Direct Edge 
exchanges and the dominant exchanges within the NASDAQ and 
NYSE families each holding on to 15–20% of the market.122 While 
there is intense competition among the exchanges, at present it 
appears difficult for new entrants to break into the industry. The 
Investors Exchange (IEX), headed by Flash Boys protagonist Brad 
Katsuyama, is an important case in point.123 Despite marketing 
itself as a more ethical alternative to the major stock exchanges, it 
has not been able to capture more than 3% of the market.124 IEX 
appears to be a cautionary tale for would-be entrants. The reasons 
for its struggles are complex but may be evidence that, like other 
online businesses, the exchange business shows a heightened 
tendency to winnow down to one, or a small number, of players 
in a “winner-takes-all,” or more accurately “winner-takes-
most,” tournament.125 
 
 119. See Nicholas Economides, The Impact of the Internet on Financial Markets, 1 J. FIN. 
TRANSFORMATION 8 (2001). 
 120. See Fleckner, supra note 68, at 2566–67; Knieps & Bauer, supra note 106, at 24. 
 121. See discussion infra Section II.B.2. 
 122. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 123. See infra Section III.B.6. 
 124. See Nicole Bullock, IEX Chief Sticks to Principles in Battle for Presence, FIN. TIMES 
(June 1, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/4c805dd6-449f-11e7-8519-9f94ee97d996. 
 125. See Economides, supra note 119, at 9; Evans, Antitrust Issues, supra note 91, at 2003. 
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B. The Exchanges Under Regulation NMS — 
A Network of MSPs or a Super-MSP? 
In the decade since Regulation NMS came into force, the most 
important, and controversial, effects of digital technology on the 
stock market have come from HFT. Both the activities of high-
frequency traders themselves and the response of the exchanges 
and others, such as dark pool operators and institutional traders, 
have played a role. The story of this transformation bears strong 
evidence that the exchanges are MSPs. Most obviously this is seen 
in the development of “maker-taker” pricing schemes at the 
exchanges, but the use of digital technology to implement special 
order types, as well as launch new exchanges, also fits the pattern 
of MSPs in the digital business environment. Meanwhile, these 
economic and technological developments have played out under 
the new regulatory regime of Regulation NMS. Two provisions of 
Regulation NMS are most important for the stock exchanges as 
MSPs: By “socializing order flow” the Order Protection Rule (Rule 
611) weakens the liquidity network effect, and the Access Rule 
(Rule 610) provides the parameters within which the exchanges can 
offer rebates to broker-dealers for providing order flow, i.e., 
liquidity. The operation of these rules in the new environment has 
resulted in intense competition among the exchanges. Traders have 
paid lower fees, as intended, but in response the exchanges have 
sought alternative revenue sources in the form of higher fees for 
their proprietary data. The ensuing disputes over the exercise of 
market power on the part of the exchanges leads back to the 
question of monopoly—or now, oligopoly—power that was the 
original impetus for the 1975 Securities Acts Amendments. Profits 
the exchanges can no longer make from the provision of trading 
services are now supplanted by profits from the sale of information 
generated by those trading services. 
Section II.B surveys the current state of the markets, with an eye 
on the nature of the stock market as MSP. Market fragmentation 
has increased greatly in recent years, particularly in the migration 
of trading to dark pools and other non-exchange venues; 
fragmentation among the lit markets is less important, however, as 
four exchanges, grouped into three exchange families, hold the 
bulk of the market share. Nevertheless, the response of the 
exchanges to the current environment bears cause for concern, as 
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certain techniques appear to tilt the playing field to the benefit of 
some and disadvantage of others. The current state of the markets 
is complex. Regulation NMS cuts against the nature of the stock 
market as an MSP, with its strong pressures toward centralization, 
to the benefit of customers through increased competition. On the 
other hand, it creates an environment that allows a host of other 
costs and inefficiencies to take root, jeopardizing the SEC’s mission 
of investor protection. 
1. Dark fragmentation 
While stock trading is now fragmented among thirteen 
exchanges, a significant share of trading occurs outside of the 
exchanges entirely. The most basic type of fragmentation then is 
between the “lit” markets, or the registered exchanges, and the 
“dark” markets, or “dark fragmentation.”126 At present, about 40% 
of stock (by dollar volume) is traded off-exchange in a variety of 
venues.127 Stock also trades off-exchange in the internalization 
engines of broker-dealers such as the large banks, and in the 
private, “upstairs” market.128 Dark pools are probably the best 
known of these venues. They are known as “dark” venues because, 
unlike at the exchanges, the quotes (buy and sell orders) submitted 
to them are not publicly displayed. When a trade is made, however, 
that information is sent to the SIP and so contributes to the price 
discovery process after the fact.129 Dark pools are governed by 
Regulation Alternative Trading Systems (Regulation ATS) under 
the 1934 Act and are required to register as broker-dealers.130 
The volume of stock traded off-exchange has risen considerably 
in recent years. At the time Regulation NMS came into force, it was 
estimated that only 4% of shares traded in alternative venues.131 By 
 
 126. See Ryan J. Davies & Erik R. Sirri, The Economics and Regulation of Secondary 
Trading Markets 15 (Jul. 20, 2017) (working paper) (on file with Columbia University, The 
New Special Study of the Securities Market), www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files 
/microsites/capital-markets/davies_sirri_20170720_final_draft.pdf. 
 127. See Equities LiquidityMatrix, TABBFORUM (Sept. 14, 2018), https://tabbforum.com 
/liquidity-matrix?ticket=ST-15372207594461-IJd8RwED8FV9IZop0j3uSVBWoc7a9YiYhpUHUL4c. 
 128. See COWEN ATM, supra note 2. 
 129. See SHORTER & MILLER, supra note 2, at 2. 
 130. Id. at 5. 
 131. See Scott Patterson, ‘Dark Pools’ Face Scrutiny, WALL STREET J. (June 5, 2013, 9:55 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324069104578527361102049152. 
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2016, that amount had climbed to approximately 36%.132 Of this 
36%, approximately 13% traded in dark pools, with the other 23% 
trading in other off-exchange venues.133 Fueling the rise of alter-
native trading venues is the search for lower transaction costs, as 
well as a desire to avoid interacting with high-frequency traders. 
Because orders submitted to dark pools are not publicly posted or 
otherwise distributed, it is in principle more difficult for high-
frequency traders to trade against these orders or otherwise exploit 
them. While trading in dark pools clearly entails risks,134 investors 
are attracted to them because trading on the exchanges also entails 
significant risk of adverse selection, as well as higher fixed costs.135 
As Stephen Lofchie suggests, instead of thinking of dark pools as 
something sinister or bad, it might be more appropriate to think of 
them as “protective coves.”136 
The rise of dark pools and off-exchange trading has been 
controversial and certainly carries with it considerable negative 
externalities. Most importantly, traders submitting quotes are not 
contributing to the price discovery process surrounding a stock but 
are instead free-riding on prices generated on the lit markets. 
Insofar as the stock exchange is a mechanism for allocating capital 
efficiently, significant amounts of dark trading detract from this 
important public function.137 On the other hand, the rise of dark 
pools has coincided with the growth of HFT and must be seen as 
an effort on the part of investors to avoid the risks and costs of the 
lit markets. Turning back to the economic theory discussed above, 
the model of Pagano predicts that fragmentation will occur when 
different groups of investors have different cost and risk profiles.138 
 
 132. See COWEN ATM, supra note 2. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See, e.g., Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 32; see also Christopher 
Mercurio, Dark Pool Regulation, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 69 (2013). 
 135. See SHORTER & MILLER, supra note 2, at 4–5; Lofchie, supra note 25, at 4–6; Yadav, 
supra note 103, at 33–35; see also Frank Hatheway, Amy Kwan & Hui Zheng, An Empirical 
Analysis of Market Segmentation on U.S. Equities Markets 52 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
2399, 2401 (2017) (“[A]dverse selection risk on dark venues is 60% to 80% less than that on 
lit markets . . . .”). 
 136. Lofchie, supra note 25, at 5. 
 137. See DOMBALAGIAN, supra note 109, at 62; Hatheway et al., supra note 135, at 2424–
25; see also Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets, 68 
VAND. L. REV. 1607 (2015). 
 138. See Pagano, supra note 79, at 268–69. 
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The rise of dark pools must be understood in light of the risks posed 
to slower, longer-term investors by trading on the exchanges. While 
in principle it may be best for trading to occur on lit markets, it is 
difficult to blame investors for wanting to trade in the dark markets 
in search of lower transaction costs and less risk of adverse selec-
tion. Nevertheless, dark fragmentation has significant drawbacks—
it can result in negative effects on market quality, and if financial 
markets information is a public good, insofar as only post-trade 
information is reported, dark trading fails to contribute to its 
creation and free-rides on prices created by the lit markets.139 And 
these more general considerations are buttressed by the instances 
in which dark pool operators failed to safeguard their venues for 
all their customers.140 
2. Visible fragmentation 
The 64% of trading volume that occurs on the “lit” markets is 
itself fragmented among the thirteen different stock exchanges. Of 
these markets, the data provided by Cowen ATM indicates that no 
single exchange has more than 14% of the total.141 It must also be 
noted that eleven of the exchanges are grouped under three holding 
companies that offer different venues, each catering to different 
groups of investors through different pricing mechanisms. The 
NYSE group operates the NYSE, NYSE Arca, and NYSE Ameri-
can142 exchanges, as well as the NYSE National, which traces its 
existence back to the National Stock Exchange and before that the 
Cincinnati Stock Exchange.143 NASDAQ operates the NASDAQ 
 
 139. See DOMBALAGIAN, supra note 109, at 27–28; see also J. Harold Mulherin, Jeffry M. 
Netter & James A. Overdahl, Prices Are Property: The Organization of Financial Exchanges from 
a Transaction Cost Perspective, 34 J. L. & ECON. 591 (1991). 
 140. See, e.g., Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 32. See generally Brian P. 
Baxter, The Securities Black Market: Dark Pool Trading and the Need for a More Expansive 
Regulation ATS-N, 70 VAND. L. REV. 311 (2017). 
 141. See COWEN ATM, supra note 2. 
 142. Formerly the NYSE MKT, the NYSE American is intended to compete with IEX 
and includes a 350-microsecond “speed bump” and a reliance on midpoint orders. Such a 
move is ironic, considering the NYSE’s vociferous opposition to IEX’s application to become 
a registered exchange. See John D’Antona, NYSE American Marketplace Launches, TRADERS 
MAG. (July 25, 2017), http://www.tradersmagazine.com/news/ecns_and_exchanges/nyse 
-american-marketplace-launches-116480-1.html. 
 143. See NYSE Regulation, NYSE, https://www.nyse.com/regulation (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2018). 
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(with 14.0% of volume, the single largest exchange),144 NASDAQ 
BX, and NASDAQ PSX exchanges.145 And Cboe Global Markets 
operates the BZX (Bats-Z), BYX (Bats-Y), EDGA, and EDGX 
exchanges.146 These three groups therefore comprise the dominant 
operators of exchange services in the American market. Finally, 
there is the Investors Exchange, or IEX, and the Chicago Stock 
Exchange, CHX.147 Given that IEX and CHX together currently 
account for less than 4.0% of market volume, the market for equity 
trading services exhibits a high degree of consolidation when 
considered from the point of view of ownership of the 
various exchanges. 
Upon the promulgation of Regulation NMS, but before it came 
into force in 2007, the bulk of trading still occurred on the NYSE: 
the NYSE held on to nearly 80% of the trading in NYSE-listed 
stocks.148 It is important to note that NYSE Rule 390, which had 
prevented NYSE members from trading NYSE-listed stocks 
anywhere other than on the NYSE, was repealed in 2000.149 Despite 
that rule change, the NYSE held on to the vast bulk of American 
stock trading. 
By 2016, the market was split into the following venues:150 	  
 
 144. See COWEN ATM, supra note 2. 
 145. See Nasdaq Equities Market Data, NASDAQ, https://business.nasdaq.com/intel/GIS 
/Market-Data-Equities.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2018). 
 146. See Cboe U.S. Equities, CBOE, https://markets.cboe.com/us/equities/overview 
(last visited Dec. 30, 2018). 
 147. See Last Trading Day, IEX TRADING GROUP (Oct. 18, 2018), https://iextrading 
.com/stats/; John McCrank, Chicago Stock Exchange Says Seeking New Potential Buyers, REUTERS 
(Mar. 6, 2018, 11:17 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chicagostocexchange-m-a/chi 
cago-stock-exchange-says-seeking-new-potential-buyers-idUSKCN1GI2I0. 
 148. See Concept Release on Equity Market Structure 6, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
61358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3593, 3595 (Jan. 21, 2010). 
 149. See Oesterle, supra note 35, at 614. 
 150. COWEN ATM, supra note 2; data from BATS Market Data. 
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As of 2016, the fragmentation among venues is fairly even, 
with the NASDAQ having the single-greatest volume of 14.0%. 
When the exchanges are grouped together by ownership, no single 
group possesses more than a quarter of the total market: the four 
exchanges owned by the NYSE group have 24.2%, the NASDAQ 
group has 17.4%, and the Cboe group has 20.6%. Although there is 
significant fragmentation among the thirteen venues, and far more 
alternative venues, the degree of concentration at the group level in 
the lit markets is suggestive of oligopoly. 
3. The response of the exchanges 
The review presented above indicates that on the level of the 
trading system as a whole, the pressures toward fragmentation are 
counteracting the inherent network effect of exchange trading. 
Regulation NMS has only been in force for a decade, and it must be 
Exchange Market Share 
Off-Exchange 36.8% 
Nasdaq 14.0% 
NYSE 13.3% 
NYSE Arca 10.7% 
EDGX 7.2% 
BATS-Z 6.5% 
BATS-Y 4.3% 
EDGA 2.6% 
Nasdaq BX 2.4% 
Nasdaq PSX 1.0% 
IEX 0.5% 
CHX 0.4% 
NYSE Mkt 0.2% 
NSX 0.0% 
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remembered that this is a very short period of time in the entire 
sweep of the economic history of the United States—the NYSE, for 
example, traces back to the Buttonwood Agreement of 1792.151 In 
addition, the past twenty years have been ones of rapid and 
ongoing technological change, so it is too early to predict which 
forces will ultimately prevail. With the advent of Regulation NMS, 
the exchanges are locked in a fierce battle for market share and, 
ultimately, survival. In order to meet their primary objective of 
attracting liquidity, they offer not only rebates for liquidity 
“makers” but other enticements as well. And to make up for lost 
revenue from trading, they have raised fees for their proprietary 
data feeds. The intense debate surrounding both the various means 
of enticing traders—particularly the high-volume, high-frequency 
ones—to their exchanges, as well as increasing market data fees, 
suggests that the forces that have disciplined MSPs in other 
industries have not been operative on the exchanges. The reasons 
why this may be so highlight the nature of exchange trading as a 
natural monopoly and the effects of knitting together a collection of 
competing MSPs into a single, linked trading system. 
From the point of view of the exchanges, in the past decade 
they have been cast into a fight for their very survival.152 The charts 
above indicate the rapid decline in market share of the NYSE since 
2005, which had long held a de facto monopoly position in trading 
of NYSE-listed securities.153 Not only were the major investment 
banks setting up dark pools as alternative venues for institutional 
traders who previously relied on the “upstairs market” at the NYSE 
for block trades, broker-dealers began to execute trades internally. 
The exchanges responded to the competition in a variety of ways. 
 
 151. See Stuart Banner, The Origin of the New York Stock Exchange, 1791–1860, 27 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 113, 115 (1998). 
 152. See Brummer, supra note 7, at 1007; Fleckner, supra note 68, at 2574; see also Amir N. 
Licht, Stock Exchange Mobility, Unilateral Recognition, and the Privatization of Securities Regu-
lation, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 583 (2001) (exploring competitive pressures on exchanges in the pre-
Regulation NMS environment). 
 153. The NYSE maintained its monopoly position in the trading of NYSE-listed 
securities in part through the operation of NYSE Rule 390, which prohibited “off-board” 
trading by NYSE members of NYSE securities. See Mark Borrelli, Market Making in the 
Electronic Age, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 815, 838–40 (2001). 
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a. Maker-taker pricing. In the competition for order flow, they 
followed the early ECNs and adopted “maker-taker” pricing.154 
While recently the subject of significant controversy,155 maker-taker 
pricing was pioneered in the 1990s by Island, an early ECN.156 It 
involves the exchange issuing a rebate to a trader posting a quote, 
the maker of liquidity, that is then hit by another trader, the taker, 
who buys or sells at the posted price.157 Maker-taker fees are cal-
culated off of the fee permitted under the Access Rule of Regulation 
NMS, Rule 610,158 which allows exchanges to charge a fee to traders 
of up to 0.30¢ per share, or 30¢ per 100 shares. If an exchange 
charges a 0.30¢ fee, a typical rebate paid to the maker of liquidity 
would be 0.25¢. This means that the taker of liquidity will pay 0.30¢ 
for the trade, the maker of liquidity will receive a rebate 0.25¢, and 
the exchange will pocket the difference of 0.05¢. 
Maker-taker pricing has a number of effects on securities 
markets.159 Most importantly, it can incentivize brokers to route 
customer orders to the exchanges paying the best rebates, arguably 
causing them to violate their duty of best execution.160 It also 
distorts prices, thereby reducing transparency in the markets, as it 
creates a discrepancy between the posted price of a stock and the 
 
 154. See generally Larry Harris, Maker-Taker Pricing Effects on Market Quotations 
(Nov. 14, 2013) (working paper) (on file with USC Marshall School of Business). 
 155. See, e.g., Conflicts of Interest, Investor Loss of Confidence, and High Speed Trading in U.S. 
Stock Markets: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Home-
land Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 7–9 (2014) (statement of Robert Battalio, Professor 
of Finance, University of Notre Dame); Curt Bradbury & Kenneth E. Bentsen Jr., How to Improve 
Market Structure, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2014, 7:03 AM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014 
/07/14/how-to-improve-market-structure/; Jonathan Macey & David Swensen, Opinion, 
Wall Street Profits by Putting Investors in the Slow Lane, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2017), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2017/07/18/opinion/wall-street-brokers-rebates-kickbacks.html; see also 
Stanislav Dolgopolov, The Maker-Taker Pricing Model and Its Impact on the Securities Market 
Structure: A Can of Worms for Securities Fraud?, 8 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 231 (2014). 
 156. See PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 157–60. 
 157. See Harris, Maker-Taker Pricing, supra note 154, at 2. 
 158. 17 C.F.R. § 242.610 (2018). 
 159. See Harris, Maker-Taker Pricing, supra note 154; Haim Bodek & Stanislav Dolgo-
polov, Deconstructing Maker-Taker, Part 1: A Gordian Knot for Market Structure?, TABBFORUM 
(June 30, 2014), https://tabbforum.com/opinions/deconstructing-maker-taker-part-1-a-gor 
dian-knot-for-market-structure. 
 160. See Robert Battalio, Shane A. Corwin & Robert Jennings, Can Brokers Have It All? 
On the Relation Between Make-Take Fees and Limit Order Execution Quality, 71 J. FIN. 2193, 
2197 (2016). 
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real price received by the seller.161 And it is deeply implicated in the 
development of HFT generally and the special order types it uses.162 
Nevertheless, it is most obviously a way to attract liquidity by 
offering a discount to traders bringing liquidity to an exchange or 
other venue. It therefore reflects Rochet and Tirole’s insight that the 
volume of transactions carried out on an MSP is sensitive to the 
allocation of trading costs between the parties interacting there.163 
Similar to a website that offers news content for free to readers 
while charging advertisers a fee, maker-taker pricing is an acknow-
ledgement of both the value of liquidity suppliers and that liquidity 
takers will pay to access that resource. This is not to deny that 
rebates to makers can have deleterious second-order effects, as 
Jonathan Macey and David Swensen, Haim Bodek and Stanislav 
Dolgopolov, and others point out.164 Rebates can tempt brokers to 
violate their duty of best execution, as well as distort the efficiency 
of the stock market by causing the price in a quote to deviate from 
the true price paid to the seller. Nevertheless, maker-taker pricing 
fundamentally appears to reflect the fact that the greatest value of 
transactions on an exchange will occur when parties on one side of 
the platform, the suppliers of liquidity, are charged less than those 
on the other side for transacting on the exchange.165 
 
 161. See Harris, Maker-Taker Pricing, supra note 154, at 3 (explaining that maker-taker 
creates a transparency problem by causing net spreads to diverge from quoted spreads). But 
see Yong Chao, Chen Yao & Mao Ye, Tick Size Constraints, Two-Sided Markets, and Compe-
tition Between Stock Exchanges 35 (2015) (working paper), https://www.sec.gov/comments 
/265-29/26529-37.pdf (explaining that by reducing the effective tick (real pricing), maker-
taker reduces frictions). 
 162. See Maureen O’Hara, High Frequency Market Microstructure, 116 J. FIN. ECON. 257, 
262 (2015). 
 163. See supra notes 96–100 and accompanying text. Despite the intuitive nature of the 
connection between maker-taker pricing and Rochet & Tirole’s insights on MSP pricing, it is 
not widely discussed in the market microstructure literature. But see Evans, Antitrust Issues, 
supra note 91, at 293–94; Levin, supra note 93, at 6; Chester Spatt, The New Realities of Market 
Structure and Liquidity: Where Have We Been? Where Are We Going? 9–10 (May 3, 2016) 
(presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 2016 Financial Markets Conference, “Get-
ting a Grip on Liquidity: Markets, Institutions, and Central Banks”). 
 164. See supra notes 155, 159. 
 165. An interesting variation is the “inverted exchange,” where liquidity takers (not 
makers) are paid a rebate. Inverted exchanges are attractive to brokers handling trades for 
institutional or retail investors using market orders. Currently, the NASDAQ BX, BYX, 
EDGA, and NYSE National exchanges offer taker-maker pricing. See Alexander Osipovich, 
‘Inverted’ Model Said to Be Considered for NYSE’s Newest Exchange, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 28, 
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b. Special order types, co-location, and enriched data feeds. In addi-
tion to maker-taker pricing, the exchanges have developed a 
variety of other features to lure traders to their venues, including 
special order types, flash orders, and co-location. All of these are 
typically used by high-frequency traders in conjunction with 
proprietary data feeds offering a greater depth of information than 
the SIP provides. In the new world of trading, high-frequency 
traders have become the exchanges’ best customers, responsible for 
over half of trading volume in 2016.166 In order to attract them, 
exchanges developed special order types that facilitated their 
trading techniques. These orders went far beyond the basic market 
orders and limit orders and were designed, allegedly in conjunction 
with the HFT shops, to allow HFT firms to take advantage of the 
particular conditions and regulatory restraints governing exchange 
trading.167 A well-known example is the Hide Not Slide order 
developed by the Direct Edge exchanges, EDGA and EDGX. 
Rule 610(d) of Regulation NMS prohibits an exchange posting an 
order that “locks” or “crosses” a quote on another exchange.168 This 
means that if one exchange currently displays the national best bid 
(a buy order) in a stock of $12.60, another exchange cannot post an 
offer (a sell order) at the same price. Such an order would “lock” 
the market, representing a fundamentally irrational state of affairs: 
a trader posting that order should immediately hit the previously 
posted bid. Similarly, a sell order of $12.59 would “cross” the mar-
ket and represents an even more irrational state of affairs. In order 
to prevent such situations, Rule 610(d) prohibits “locks and 
crosses.” (Note however that maker-taker pricing incentivizes 
posting a locked or crossed order due to the desire to avoid paying 
an access fee and to receive a rebate.169) The Hide Not Slide order 
 
2017, 5:33 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/inverted-model-said-to-be-considered-for 
-nyses-newest-exchange-1488277981. 
 166. See RENA S. MILLER & GARY SHORTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44443, HIGH 
FREQUENCY TRADING: OVERVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 2 (2016) (stating in 2016 that HFT 
accounted for “roughly 55% of trading volume in U.S. equity markets”). 
 167. See generally Stanislav Dolgopolov, High-Frequency Trading, Order Types, and the 
Evolution of the Securities Market Structure: One Whistleblower’s Consequences for Securities 
Regulation, 2014 J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 145, 147–54 (2014). 
 168. 17 C.F.R. § 242.610(d) (2018) (prohibiting “[l]ocking or crossing quotations”). 
 169. See Ivy Schmerken, Nasdaq’s Battle over Locked Crossed Markets, INFORMATIONWEEK 
WALLSTREET & TECH. (Apr. 15, 2003, 12:22 PM),  http://www.wallstreetandtech.com/exchanges 
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was formulated to put its user at the head of the line once the 
market moved.170 Because it allowed its user to be first in line once 
the market unlocked, or uncrossed, it was seen as facilitating 
queue-jumping on the part of HFT. In addition to complaining 
about its fundamental mechanics, critics such as Haim Bodek 
complained that the exchanges hid the details of their operation 
from slower, institutional traders.171 Indeed, Direct Edge, by then 
acquired by BATS, was fined by the SEC for improper disclosure of 
its Hide Not Slide order in 2015, substantiating Bodek’s claims.172 
Other means used by the exchanges to attract order flow from 
high-frequency traders include offering “flash orders” to traders,173 
which allow high-frequency traders to trade on incoming quotes 
before they are transmitted to the SIP, and co-location services and 
enriched data feeds.174 While much more could be said about all of 
these developments, they have given rise to considerable contro-
versy. From the point of view of the exchanges, they are merely 
offering a service open to all who are willing to pay for it, and it has 
long been considered acceptable for businesses to offer in-depth or 
enhanced information to customers willing to pay for it. On the 
other hand, the cumulative effect of these services offered to high-
frequency traders is to create a two-tiered marketplace.175 In the 
fight for market share, the exchanges appear to have colluded with 
 
/nasdaqandrsquos-battle-over-locked-crossed-markets/d/d-id/1255842.html (exploring the 
interaction of liquidity rebates and locked and crossed markets). 
 170. See Scott Patterson & Jenny Strasburg, For Superfast Stock Traders, a Way to Jump 
Ahead in Line, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 19, 2012, 5:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10 
000872396390443989204577599243693561670. 
 171. See, e.g., Haim Bodek, HFT Checkmate—The Alpha in Order Types, TABBFORUM 
(Dec. 31, 2013), https://tabbforum.com/opinions/hft-checkmate-the-alpha-in-an-order-type. 
 172. See Hope, supra note 73; cf. Matt Levine, ‘Hide Not Slide’ Orders Were Slippery and 
Hidden, BLOOMBERG: OPINION (Jan. 12, 2015, 5:35 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion 
/articles/2015-01-13/hide-not-slide-orders-were-slippery-and-hidden. 
 173. See Lawrence E. Harris & Ethan Namvar, The Economics of Flash Orders and Trading, 
14 J. INV. MGMT. 74 (2016). 
 174. See Jacob Adrian, Informational Inequality: How High Frequency Traders Use Premier 
Access to Information to Prey on Institutional Investors, 14 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 256, 266–
68 (2016). 
 175. See Steven McNamara, The Law and Ethics of High-Frequency Trading, 17 MINN. J. L. 
SCI. & TECH. 71, 113–14 (2016). 
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their best customers to allow them to profit at the expense of their 
slower, less important ones.176 
It is interesting to compare the practices of high-frequency 
traders and the stock exchanges with the MSPs discussed by David 
Evans in “Governing Bad Behavior By Users of Multi-sided 
Platforms.”177 Evans shows that, in general, MSPs will act to maxi-
mize the value of their platform (and by extension, the profits of the 
platform itself) by developing governance mechanisms that reduce 
harmful behavior on the part of participants. An example of this 
would be the governance of trading practices at the London Stock 
Exchange in the 1700s through the 1900s.178 If unchecked, market 
manipulation and insider trading would lead to distrust of the ex-
change and a reluctance of investors to trade there, so the exchange 
itself prohibited such conduct. The main mechanism available to a 
platform to police members who engage in manipulative or abusive 
activity is to exclude them—the “Bouncer’s Right.”179 
Query however whether the exchanges are currently incenti-
vized to exclude traders who create negative externalities for 
others, particularly if those traders are responsible for a large 
fraction of the total trading volume. The exchanges, in an intense 
competition for order flow, lack the real ability to exclude traders, 
particularly their most active ones. Furthermore, they are tempted 
to work with those more active and very sophisticated traders in 
profiting from the less agile order flow of institutional traders, in 
effect taking a cut of the profits gleaned from HFT activity. This is 
most obvious with the increasing fees charged for co-location, but 
many practices of the exchanges arguably amount to taking a cut of 
the profits HFT makes off of slower traders. 
It is also interesting to reflect on the role of Regulation NMS 
here. The operation of the Order Protection Rule, which mandates 
 
 176. See, e.g., PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 204–05 (“High-speed firms worked hand in 
hand with the trading networks to create exotic order types that would behave in very 
specific ways.”); LEWIS, supra note 21, at 163 (“By giving HFT what it wanted (speed, in 
relation to the rest of the market; complexity only HFT understood; and payment to brokers 
for their customers’ orders, so that HFT had something to trade against), the new stock 
exchanges had stolen market share from the old stock exchanges.”). 
 177. Evans, Governing Bad Behavior, supra note 69. 
 178. See id. at 1232–35. 
 179. See id. at 1221 (citing Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights 
to Exclude, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1835 (2006)). 
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routing an order to the exchange currently posting the NBBO, 
appears to interfere with the natural operation of the liquidity 
network effect, which would otherwise lead to the concentration of 
trading on one venue or a small number of venues.180 With less 
competitive pressure on the exchanges, the ability to exclude would 
likely be much greater, as the examples Evans provides suggest.181 
The London Stock Exchange was to some extent a monopoly MSP 
in its market,182 and to some degree Facebook (for social media) and 
Google (online search) are as well. One of the drawbacks of 
Regulation NMS then is that it appears to cut against the incentives 
the stock exchanges have traditionally had to police the conduct of 
those trading on them. By knitting together the various exchanges 
in a single, competitive system, Regulation NMS appears to have 
incentivized bad behavior on the part of the exchanges themselves, 
albeit in a competition in which their very existence is at stake. 
c. Rising data fees and the NetCoalition litigation. The phenomena 
reviewed so far involve exchanges competing with one another for 
order flow, that is, market share in their core business of facilitating 
transactions. While transaction revenue has been under pressure 
for decades, revenue from the sale of market data has filled the gap, 
accounting for an increasing share of exchange revenue in 
recent years183: 
 
 
 180. See generally Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks to the 
Georgetown University Center for Financial Markets and Policy Conference on Financial 
Markets Quality (Sept. 16, 2014); Spatt, supra note 163. 
 181. See Evans, Governing Bad Behavior, supra note 69, at 1226–40. 
 182. See R.C. Michie, The London Stock Exchange and the British Securities Market, 1850–
1914, 38 ECON. HIST. REV. 61, 75 (1985). 
 183. See SEC Review Threatens Growth of Exchanges’ Lucrative Market Data Fees, S&P 
GLOBAL MKT. INTELLIGENCE (Nov. 7, 2016, 9:45 AM), https://www.spglobal.com/market 
intelligence/en/news-insights/research/sec-review-threatens-growth-of-exchanges-lucra 
tive-market-data-fees (data source: SNL Financial). 
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The steady increase in revenue from information services, 
amounting to approximately 62% growth over the past five years,184 
has prompted criticism that the exchanges are effectively acting as 
a monopoly, or more accurately, oligopoly, supplier of trading 
data.185 In earlier decades, of course, the NYSE was a de facto 
monopoly, and its members profited from both high commissions 
and wide spreads on stock trades.186 In the current environment, 
traders and other parties who use the proprietary data sold by the 
exchanges again charge that the exchanges are acting in a 
monopolistic fashion, this time by exploiting their market power to 
 
 184. See Robin Wigglesworth, Nicole Bullock & Gregory Meyer, Costly Data Battle Heats 
Up Between Traders and Equity Exchanges, FIN. TIMES (July 5, 2016), https://www.ft.com 
/content/785092ec-33d8-11e6-ad39-3fee5ffe5b5b. 
 185. See, e.g., HEALTHY MKTS. ASS’N, U.S. EQUITY MARKET DATA: HOW CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST OVERWHELM AN OUTDATED REGULATORY MODEL AND MARKET PARTICIPANTS (Nov. 
2017); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC 
OPPORTUNITIES: CAPITAL MARKETS 63 (Oct. 2017); Dave Michaels, Traders Want to Know What 
Exchanges Earn from Market Data, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 6, 2017, 6:20 PM), https://www 
.wsj.com/articles/traders-want-to-know-what-exchanges-earn-from-market-data-1512592201; 
Larry Tabb, Fight over Market Data Fees Is Going to Get Ugly, TABBFORUM (Dec. 28, 2016), 
https://tabbforum.com/opinions/fight-over-market-data-fees-is-going-to-get-ugly. 
 186. See McNamara, supra note 175, at 78–81. 
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charge unjustified rates to traders who need this data to compete or 
even to comply with a broker’s duty of best execution. The debate 
over market data fees is intense and ongoing, with an important 
2016 SEC decision in the long-running NetCoalition (now SIFMA) 
litigation currently on appeal.187 It also raises the question of 
whether the exchanges, which are knit together into a single, virtual 
marketplace through the national market system, in fact constitute 
a sort of super-MSP. While the exchanges compete vigorously for 
market share, they do appear to be acting in concert in gradually 
raising their market data fees.188 
The market data litigation began in response to the SEC’s 2006 
order approving the imposition of fees by NYSE Arca for its 
“ArcaBook” data, which provides traders with complete informa-
tion concerning the depth of liquidity in a stock.189 The petitioner, 
NetCoalition, was a group of twenty internet companies and 
SIFMA, which represented over 600 trading firms.190 NetCoalition 
argued that the SEC erred in approving the fees, because they 
violated Regulation NMS Rule 603(a)’s requirement that prices for 
“non-core” data be both “fair and reasonable” and “not unfairly 
discriminatory.”191 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
 
 187. See NetCoalition v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 188. While not at issue in the Netcoalition litigation, the gradual rise in prices first by 
one exchange and then others is suggestive of “tacit collusion” or “conscious parallelism.” 
While “[c]ircumstantial evidence can establish an antitrust conspiracy,” purely tacit 
collusion is not actionable under current U.S. antitrust law. In re Text Messaging Antitrust 
Litig., 782 F.3d 867, 871 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 
F.3d, 622, 627–29 (7th Cir. 2010)); see also Edward J. Green, Robert C. Marshall & Leslie M. 
Marx, Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly, in 2 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 464 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2015). 
 189. Order Setting Aside Action by Delegated Authority and Approving Proposed 
Rule Change Relating to NYSE Arca Data, Exchange Act Release No. 34-59039, 73 Fed. Reg. 
74,770–01 (Dec. 9, 2008). 
 190. See NetCoalition, 615 F.3d at 527. 
 191. 17 C.F.R. § 242.603(a) (2018). “Core data” is required to be reported to the SIP by 
the exchanges, and consists of 
(1) last sale reports, which include the price at which the latest sale of the security 
occurred, the size of the sale and the exchange where it took place; 
(2) the current highest bid and lowest offer for the security, along with the number 
of shares available at those prices, at each exchange; and 
(3) the ‘national best bid and offer,’ or NBBO, which are the highest bid and lowest 
offer currently available in the country and the exchange(s) where those prices 
are available. 
NetCoalition, 615 F.3d at 529. 
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rejected NetCoalition’s argument that the SEC should use a “cost-
based approach” and not a “market-based approach” but agreed 
with the Petitioner that the SEC had not presented evidence suf-
ficient to justify the fee imposition. The court also stated that it did 
not mean that “a cost analysis is irrelevant. On the contrary, in a 
competitive market, the price of a product is supposed to approach 
its marginal cost,” and “[s]upracompetitive pricing may be evi-
dence of ‘monopoly,’ or ‘market,’ power.”192 The court found that 
even though a market-based approach is sufficient, the SEC failed 
to “require NYSE Arca to substantiate its market data costs.”193 
General statements that order flow competition was “fierce”194 
failed to justify “the SEC’s conclusion that order flow competition 
constrains market data prices.”195 The court also found that the SEC 
had lacked sufficient evidence to conclude that purchasers would 
substitute another product for the NYSE Arca depth-of-book 
offering “instead of paying a supracompetitive price.”196 The order 
was thus vacated and remanded to the SEC for further proceedings. 
After the D.C. Circuit determined in 2013 that it lacked 
jurisdiction over the case due to the new section 19(b)(3)(C) of the 
Exchange Act, the case was returned to the SEC, where it was 
assigned to Chief Administrative Law Judge Brenda Murray.197 As 
directed by the D.C. Circuit, Judge Murray focused on evidence 
that competition constrains the pricing of non-core market data by 
the exchanges. Expert witness testimony established that of 350,000 
professional subscribers to NASDAQ’s data services, 30,000 of 
 
“Non-core data” is all other data generated by the exchanges, and most importantly includes 
quotes deeper in the order book, allowing a trader to see all shares available at an exchange. 
Id. at 529–30; see also Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,567 (June 29, 2005). 
 192. NetCoalition, 615 F.3d at 537 (citing Tejas Power Corp. v. FERC, 908 F.2d 998, 1004 
(D.C. Cir. 1990)). 
 193. Id. at 538. 
 194. Id. at 539. 
 195. Id. at 541. 
 196. Id. at 544. 
 197. Exchange Act section 19(b)(C)(3) was amended by section 916 of The Dodd-Frank 
Act of 2010, entitled “Streamlining of filing procedures for self-regulatory organizations.” It 
allows changes to rules setting fees to take effect immediately upon filing with the SEC, and 
removes the ability of the SEC to “abrogate” a rule change within sixty days of filing with 
the SEC. Such a change effectively shifts the burden of any decision as to the validity of an 
SRO rule change from the SRO to the SEC. See Rules of Practice, Exchange Act Release No. 
34-63723, 76 Fed. Reg. 4066 (Jan. 24, 2011). 
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them purchased the most comprehensive “Total View” service.198 
Furthermore, of these 30,000 subscriptions, 5000 were for servers 
operated by an estimated 100 HFT firms. These firms were respon-
sible for approximately 90% of trading on NASDAQ.199 Because the 
total amount of trading is concentrated in a relatively small number 
of firms, these firms allegedly held “the upper hand” in negotia-
tions with NASDAQ. While the exchanges’ expert witnesses con-
ceded that HFT firms would require data feeds from all exchanges, 
Judge Murray found that for the vast majority of exchange 
customers, one exchange’s non-core data was a substitute for 
another’s.200 This conclusion is supported by the fact that trading in 
most stocks is dispersed across a number of exchanges, not 
concentrated on one.201 Judge Murray also noted that there was 
substantial evidence that the exchanges considered competitive 
pressure and pushback from clients when considering rate in-
creases.202 There was also evidence that one trader diverted order 
flow from NASDAQ in response to a rate increase in 2012.203 
A number of points are important to note. First, SIFMA expert 
witness David Evans relied on the concept of an MSP to argue that 
the exchanges cross-subsidize their highly competitive transaction 
businesses by charging high prices for market data, where demand 
is more inelastic.204 NYSE expert witness Terrence Hendershott 
conceded that the exchanges are “multi-product” firms but resisted 
their characterization as MSPs. This is likely because the MSP 
literature indicates that it is natural for one side to be charged a 
higher price, whereas the thrust of the Defendants’ argument was 
that competition for order flow, in fact, constrains market data 
pricing.205 Second, Judge Murray lumps together high-frequency 
traders with all other traders when considering the entire class of 
data customers, yet focuses on them in isolation in order to 
 
 198. See Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Release No. 1015, 114 SEC Docket 1388, at 12 
(ALJ June 1, 2016) (initial decision). 
 199. Id. 
 200. See id. at 33. 
 201. See id. 
 202. See id. at 34. 
 203. See id. at 37–38. 
 204. See id. at 24–25. 
 205. See id. at 17. 
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demonstrate the power they have over the exchanges. Certainly for 
the HFT firms depth-of-book data from every exchange is not 
optional, so for their most important traders, one exchange’s 
offering is decidedly not a substitute for another’s.206 While Judge 
Murray concedes this point, because HFT firms are by far the 
exchanges’ most important customers, it is in considerable tension 
with the insistence on the substitutability of depth-of-book from the 
various exchanges.207 Third, Judge Murray rejects the notion that a 
statistical or econometric review of pricing data is necessary here: 
“Statistical evidence is not required to resolve every dispute.”208 
Although the exchanges were only able to point to one instance of 
a trader diverting order flow from NASDAQ in response to a price 
increase, evidence that the exchanges devoted sufficient resources 
to marketing their data offerings and to considering customer 
reaction to fee increases suffices to show that “depth-of-book prices 
are constrained by order flow competition.”209 Nor are estimated 
profit margins of 70–85% on data products determinative, despite 
the statement of the D.C. Circuit that “in a competitive market, the 
price of a product is supposed to approach its marginal cost.”210 
Even conceding accounting questions as to true marginal cost, such 
margins seem high. Finally, Judge Murray seems out of touch with 
HFT practice when she determines that because “nearly 97% of all 
trades occur at or within the NBBO . . . most customers do not 
require any sort of depth-of-book data.”211 While a trade may occur 
 
 206. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 185, at 63 (“[T]he market for pro-
prietary data feeds is not fully competitive. For use in making routing and trading decisions 
for active or institutional size order flow, data from one exchange’s feed cannot substitute 
for data from another exchange’s feed.”). 
 207. See Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Release No. 1015, 114 SEC Docket 1388, at 36 
(ALJ June 1, 2016) (initial decision). Judge Murray acknowledges that high-frequency traders 
may require depth-of-book data from all exchanges, but she emphasizes that such traders 
“reflect only a small percentage of all market participants.” Id.; cf. NetCoalition v. SEC, 615 
F.3d 525, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (pointing out the tension between the SEC’s belief that the 
exchanges face significant competitive pressures in selling their market data and its 
insistence that “depth-of-book data is simply not very important to most traders, even 
professionals.”). 
 208. Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n Release No. 1015, 114 SEC Docket 1388, at 42 (ALJ 
June 1, 2016) (initial decision). 
 209. Id. 
 210. NetCoalition, 615 F.3d at 537. 
 211. Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Release No. 1015, 114 SEC Docket 1388, at 36 (ALJ 
June 1, 2016) (initial decision). This determination relies on expert witness Terrence 
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within the parameters of the NBBO, that does not mean that depth-
of-book data was not instrumental in determining whether or not 
it was a good bet.212 Indeed, if 90% of trades on NASDAQ are con-
ducted by HFT shops, which use depth-of-book data intensively, 
one suspects that more than a mere 3% of trades rely on such data. 
The decision may result in another appeal to the federal courts.213 
Given the amount of revenue and the intrinsic importance of the 
issues at stake, the outcome will be closely watched. 
This review of the economics of exchange trading illustrates the 
dual nature of the current national market system.214 In the main, 
the exchanges function as a linked network of competing MSPs. 
Regulation NMS breaks the natural operation of the network effect 
of an individual exchange as an MSP, contributing to the existence 
and survival of multiple exchanges. The resulting competition is 
fierce, leading to conduct on the part of the exchanges that has on 
occasion amounted to offering up their less-savvy customers to 
their savvier and best ones, the HFT shops. On the other hand, 
insofar as the exchanges have market power in their pricing of data, 
 
Hendershott’s testimony that most traders do not need depth-of-book data: “Hendershott 
again cited the fact that 96.7% of trades occur at the NBBO prices that are provided by core 
data.” Id. at 18. 
 212. Expert witness Hendershott “conceded that depth-of-book data may be useful to 
certain market participants, such as high-frequency traders or traders who rely on 
algorithmic computer models.” Id. For discussion of this usefulness, see Jonathan Brogaard, 
Terrence Hendershott & Ryan Riordan, High-Frequency Trading and Price Discovery, 27 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 2267, 2300 (2014) (“The results show that HFTs’ order flow is correlated with 
information embedded in the limit order book.”). 
 213. Judge Murray affirmed her 2016 decision on Dec. 21, 2017. See Sec. Indus. & Fin. 
Mkts. Ass’n, Release No. 5414, File No. 3-15350 (ALJ Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.sec 
.gov/alj/aljorders/2017/ap-5414.pdf. As this article was going to press, the SEC reversed 
Judge Murray’s decision. The SEC Commissioners found that NASDAQ and NYSE Arca had 
not met their burden of proof in demonstrating that the proposed fee increases were fair and 
reasonable. See Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Exchange Act Release No. 84423, 2018 WL 
5023228, at *3 (Oct. 16, 2018). This decision represents a new and important stage in this very 
long-running legal battle. While it does not declare the fee increases unjustified, it does 
represent a significant reversal for the exchanges and may portend new regulatory scrutiny 
of their data fee businesses. See SEC Issues Landmark Order Rejecting Nasdaq and NYSE Arca 
Market Data Fee Increases, SIDLEY UPDATES (OCT. 29, 2018), https://www.sidley.com 
/en/insights/newsupdates/2018/10/sec-issues-landmark-order-rejecting-nasdaq-and-ny 
se-arca-market-data-fee-increases. 
 214. O’Hara and Ye capture this dual nature with their observation that “while U.S. 
equity markets are spatially fragmented, they are, in fact, virtually consolidated into a single 
market with many points of entry.” Maureen O’Hara & Mao Ye, Is Market Fragmentation 
Harming Market Quality?, 100 J. FIN. ECON. 459, 460–61 (2011). 
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and to the extent they exercise it in tacit agreement with one 
another, the system as a whole has the loose character of an 
oligopoly and thus a sort of super-MSP. 
III. THE STOCK EXCHANGE AS 
VIRTUAL CENTRAL LIMIT ORDER BOOK 
Given the nature of the stock exchange as a digital MSP, what 
might the stock exchange of the future look like? Perhaps more 
speculatively, what should it look like? In recent years, a multitude 
of reforms have been proposed, including batched auctions,215 
banning maker-taker payments,216 curbing high rates of order 
cancellation,217 subjecting high-frequency traders to broker-dealer 
regulation,218 and even banning high-frequency trading alto-
gether.219 Some of these reforms might be beneficial, while others 
would seem to be mere band-aids. The notion of banning HFT 
altogether is nonsensical—HFT is not one thing, but many, and 
putting the information technology genie back in the bottle is as 
implausible in the financial markets as it would be anywhere else. 
Since the fragmentation of the current system gives rise to the 
bulk of the problems of the current market, and the stock exchange 
as digital MSP carries with it a strong tendency toward central-
ization, consideration of a market structure offering a controlled 
return to centralization is useful at this point. In fact, the not-too-
distant history of regulatory reform provides a blueprint for how 
such a centralization might be achieved: through the implemen-
tation of a central limit order book or “CLOB.” Part III sketches a 
virtual CLOB and discusses a number of specific problems it would 
either solve or mitigate. 
 
 215. See Eric Budish, Peter Cramton & John Shim, The High-Frequency Trading Arms 
Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response, 130 Q.J. ECON. 1547 (2015). 
 216. See Macey & Swensen, supra note 155. 
 217. See GARY SHORTER & RENA S. MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43608, HIGH-
FREQUENCY TRADING: BACKGROUND, CONCERNS, AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS (2014). 
 218. See Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Address at the Sandler O’Neill & Partners, L.P. 
Global Exchange and Brokerage Conference: Enhancing Our Equity Market Structure (June 
5, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014-spch060514mjw. 
 219. See Michael Shields, ECB’s Nowotny Calls for High-Frequency Trade Ban, REUTERS 
BUS. NEWS (Sept. 13, 2012, 6:52 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ecb-nowotny 
-supervision/ecbs-nowotny-calls-for-high-frequency-trade-ban-idUSBRE88C0O020120913. 
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A. Regulatory Design 
Implementation of a CLOB could take two basic forms. In the 
first and simplest, the exchange could exist as a single institution 
which would handle all stock trading. An obvious objection is that 
the exchange would then have a monopoly position and so be able 
to charge monopoly rents for its services.220 A monopoly exchange 
would also have little reason to innovate, and as a “single point of 
failure” would likely face heightened cybersecurity risks.221 Be-
cause of the inherent problems of a monopoly exchange, it is 
tempting to look at more nuanced proposals that amount to the 
institution of a “virtual CLOB.” 
Instead of moving to a single exchange, a central routing service 
for orders could be set in place that would function as a virtual 
CLOB while allowing the current exchanges to remain in existence. 
An expansion of the current Consolidated Quotation System could 
accomplish this. Instead of merely collecting the best quotes from 
each exchange, and then selecting the best of these to present as the 
NBBO, a routing service would collect the entire book of quotes in 
each stock from the various exchanges. They would then be 
compiled into a national consolidated order book. This system-
wide order book would be made available to traders, and all incom-
ing orders would be transacted on the basis of the consolidated 
order book. The prices and times as recorded in the consolidated 
order book would be the basis for trades; when a preexisting quote 
was hit, it would be sent back to the hosting exchange for 
processing. A central routing service would therefore function as 
the single determinative node in the system, eliminating problems 
which arise from fragmentation. Such a proposal would also by 
definition do away with the need for the Order Protection Rule. 
Since there would be a single, central file of all orders, and all 
incoming orders would trade against this one book, it would by 
definition provide “depth-of-book” protection for incoming orders 
 
 220. See Oesterle, supra note 35, at 636–37 (explaining that the mid-twentieth century 
dominance of the NYSE allowed it to generate monopoly rents). 
 221. See Kristin N. Johnson, Cyber Risks: Emerging Risk Management Concerns for 
Financial Institutions, 50 GA. L. REV. 131 (2015); Tom C.W. Lin, Compliance, Technology, and 
Modern Finance, 11 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 159 (2016). 
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as well as, of course, top-of-the-book protection.222 This would 
mean that protection against trade-throughs would extend to all 
quotes, not just the very best quote in the market at the time, as in 
the present system. 
In addition to depth-of-book protection, a routing service as 
virtual CLOB would also enforce strict time priority in the market, 
giving it the character of a “hard CLOB.”223 This would be unlike 
the current rule, which protects just price priority. Any quote pre-
viously entered, therefore, from whatever exchange, at the same 
price, would stand ahead in line of later entered quotes at the same 
price. In this way a central routing service would implement the 
standard rule of price-time priority used at the individual exchang-
es on the level of the national market system as a whole, something 
the current system doesn’t do.224 
The basic principles of a virtual CLOB were in fact presented at 
various points by the SEC from the early 1970s until the promul-
gation of Regulation NMS.225 In 1976 the SEC set forth the principles 
of a “Composite Central Limit Order Repository” for public com-
ment, and in 1978 it stated its belief that a “central limit order file” 
presented the best means to achieve national limit order protection 
under the 1975 Amendments. The 1978 Release stated that: 
 The objectives of a Central File are relatively simple: to make 
available a mechanism in which public limit orders can be entered 
and queued for execution in accordance with the auction trading 
principles of price and time priority and by means of which such 
orders can be assured of receiving an execution prior to the 
execution of any other order by a broker or dealer in any market 
at the same or an inferior price (determining that price by 
reference to the price required to be reported in the consolidated 
 
 222. See Stoll, supra note 53, at 171–72 (explaining how the Order Protection Rule only 
provides top-of-the-book protection). 
 223. See Oesterle, supra note 35, at 644; see also Robert L.D. Colby & Erik R. Sirri, 
Consolidation and Competition in the U.S. Equity Markets, 5 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 169, 177–78 (2010). 
 224. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 225. See Osterle, supra note 35; Junius W. Peake, Entropy and the National Market System, 
1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 301 (2006). 
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system pursuant to Rule 17a–15, in the event of a complet-
ed transaction).226 
This proposal was not meant to eliminate the various exchang-
es, but it would create a central limit order “book” or “file” that 
would have the effect of extending both depth-of-book and time 
priority to the national system at large. 
The proposals in the late 1970s met with vociferous opposition 
from the NYSE and other exchanges, which inferred that their 
implementation would likely spell the end of trading on the ex-
change floor.227 As a compromise, the Inter-Market Trading System 
or ITS was developed, which allowed for, but did not mandate, the 
routing of orders to exchanges displaying better quotes.228 The SEC 
floated the idea of a hard CLOB once again in 2000 in its request for 
comment on issues relating to market fragmentation, but has not 
broached the idea since.229 Most importantly, Regulation NMS pulls 
back from implementation of a CLOB. Rule 611 and the other rules 
offer a very limited version of a CLOB, with only top-of-the-book 
quotations given protection.230 
As with the earlier CLOB proposals, an updated proposal 
should not abolish the individual exchanges but should instead 
develop a routing service on the model of the existing Plans 
operating the SIPs. With a virtual CLOB as routing service, now the 
entire book of each exchange’s limit offers in a security would be 
collated with every other exchange’s book to present a consolidated 
limit offer book or file. This book would be available to market 
participants, just as each exchange currently offers depth-of-book 
information as part of its proprietary information offerings. And 
just as with the CTA and CQS Plans, revenue from the sale of this 
information would be allocated to the various exchanges. Such a 
 
 226. Development of National Market System, Exchange Act Release No. 34-14416, 43 
Fed. Reg. 4354, 4359 (Feb. 1, 1978) (footnotes omitted). 
 227. See Oesterle, supra note 35, at 639; Peake, supra note 225, at 308. 
 228. See Oesterle, supra note 35, at 639. 
 229. See Fragmentation Concept Release, Exchange Act Release No. 34-42450, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 10,577 (Feb. 28, 2000). 
 230. See Stoll, supra note 53; see also Craig Pirrong, SLOB vs. CLOB, STREETWISE 
PROFESSOR (Aug. 10, 2013, 1:00 PM), https://streetwiseprofessor.com/slob-vs-clob/ (refer-
ring to the current system as a “Simulacrum Limit Order Book”); Roger D. Blanc, Intermarket 
Competition and Monopoly Power in the U.S. Stock Markets, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 
273, 283 (2006) (calling the Order Protection Rule “Trade-Through Rule Lite”). 
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plan would present the same information as the proprietary data 
offerings of the exchanges, although the use of this information 
would presumably change given the great reduction in fragmen-
tation such a proposal entails. Since the central order book would 
be the single book or file used to govern the allocation of all orders 
in the system, it would function as the central nervous system of 
the entire national market system, with important implications for 
the provision of co-location services and proprietary data services, 
as discussed below. 
While this proposal moves much closer to implementing a 
single market for securities, it should be remembered that it does 
not mandate the institution of a single exchange. Leaving the cur-
rent exchanges in existence would preserve competition in the 
market for exchange services, helping to avoid the obvious 
problems of a single monopoly exchange. The governance of the 
routing system would present a primary challenge. Just as with the 
CTA and the CQS, any entity providing information to the market 
at large has elements of a public utility,231 and complaints have been 
raised about the governance of the current plans.232 The SEC should 
ensure that a wide variety of interests, including those of non-high-
frequency traders such as institutional and retail investors, are 
represented there. 
B. Problems Solved by a Virtual Central Limit Order Book 
The implementation of a CLOB would immediately cause many 
of the most important problems since the implementation of 
Regulation NMS to vanish. It would also significantly mitigate 
others, although it would also create new governance challenges. 
 
 231. See Oesterle, supra note 35, at 625 (explaining Congress’s understanding in 1975 
that an exclusive cross-market information processor is “a public utility” that “should be 
regulated accordingly”). 
 232. See Bradley Hope, Nasdaq Cancels Deal to Operate Data Feed, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 14, 
2014, 6:32 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/nasdaq-to-stop-operating-securities-infor 
mation-processor-1389727668; Ivy Schmerken, SIFMA Criticizes SIP Selection Process for Lack 
of Transparency, INFORMATIONWEEK WALLSTREET & TECH. (Oct. 17, 2014, 9:38 AM), http:// 
www.wallstreetandtech.com/data-management/sifma-criticizes-sip-selection-process-for 
-lack-of-transparency/d/d-id/1316720.html. 
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And by reducing adverse selection risk and giving depth-of-book 
protection, dark fragmentation may also decrease as well.233 
1. The staleness of the SIP disappears 
Along with the implementation of a single routing service 
would come a single source of trading information. Since the 
information presented by the virtual CLOB would be the single 
source of determinative information on stock quotes, there would 
be no need for a separate SIP. Currently, there can exist a true 
NBBO that is not yet reflected in the NBBO presented by the SIP.234 
With a central routing service offering a national order book, the 
problem of stale quotes and the NBBO would vanish. 
2. Arbitrage due to fragmentation lessens dramatically 
Because the time lag between the servers of the various exchang-
es is meaningful, HFT firms can engage in “latency arbitrage,” 
exploiting the timing gaps between the exchanges and the SIP.235 
While the profits generated by this activity appear to be in decline, it 
is a symbolically important phenomenon that is captured by the 
phrase “front-running.” Illegal front-running occurs when a broker 
trades ahead of its client’s order, before a price change occurs that 
would be caused by that order. Front-running is against both the 
rules of the exchanges and the common law applicable to broker-
dealers and is a violation of a broker’s fiduciary duty to its client.236 
Because an HFT firm almost always trades on a proprietary 
basis, not on behalf of a client, a high-frequency trader engages in 
“front-running” only in the sense that it discerns market activity 
and is able to trade ahead of it. When a trader is not front-running 
a client order, such activity is not illegal. Nevertheless, it is 
symbolically important.237 The narrative of Flash Boys centers 
 
 233. See Colby & Sirri, supra note 223, at 178. 
 234. See Ding et al., supra note 43. 
 235. See Fox et al., supra note 29, at 226–42. 
 236. Front-running on the part of broker-dealers is illegal under both the common law 
and SRO regulations. See Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff’d, 
367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966); FINRA Rule 5270, FINRA, http://finra.complinet.com/en 
/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=10860 (last visited Jan. 23, 2019). For a 
discussion of the problems HFT poses for insider trading law, see Yadav, supra note 75. 
 237. See McNamara, supra note 175. 
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around such front-running: when protagonist Katsuyama cannot 
hit listed quotes because the HFT firms posting them pull them 
ahead of his orders, he claims the markets are “rigged.”238 Even 
though electronic front-running on the part of high-frequency 
traders is legal, it strikes many long-term investors as funda-
mentally unfair. 
By definition, a virtual CLOB would eliminate arbitrage activity 
generated by the timing gaps between the exchanges. While it 
would not eliminate all arbitrage—think of arbitrage between 
market centers in Europe or Asia and those in America, between 
commodities and options markets in Chicago and stock exchange 
servers in suburban New Jersey, or even between dark pools and a 
virtual CLOB—arbitrage solely between different American stock 
markets would be eliminated. 
3. True “depth-of-book” protection implemented 
A limit order book will have all available limit orders in a stock 
listed on either side of the NBBO, thereby displaying, in a single 
place, all the available shares in a given stock and their various 
prices. Generally speaking, as prices fall away from the NBBO there 
will be more shares available because, the greater amount a 
purchaser will be willing to pay, the more shares it would be 
offered, and vice versa. The total number of shares available for 
purchase comprises the “depth-of-book” that constitutes the 
liquidity in a stock.239 In a CLOB, because all shares are listed on a 
single book, a buyer or seller has true depth-of-book protection for 
their orders. 
In the years preceding the implementation of Regulation NMS, 
certain traders and economists advocated for a true depth-of-book 
system, whereby the Order Protection Rule would require an 
exchange to send orders to any other exchange posting a better 
quote, no matter how deep in the order book those quotes were.240 
 
 238. See LEWIS, supra note 21, at 40. 
 239. See Spatt, supra note 163, at 4–5. 
 240. See, e.g., The Emerging Structure of U.S. Securities Markets and the Appropriate Role for 
Regulation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 106th Cong. 56–
61 (2000) (statement of Henry M. Paulson, Chairman and CEO, Goldman Sachs & Co.); 
Junius W. Peake, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Change and Amendment No. 1 Thereto 
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The incumbent exchanges, on the other hand, fought this 
proposal vigorously.241 
Economically, a true depth-of-book system would represent the 
best state of affairs for traders, as it would allow them to access all 
available shares at the best prices. A single limit order book by 
definition would implement such a system, since all available 
orders to buy and sell would be collated into a single list. Not only 
would arbitrage between the various exchanges be eliminated but 
all orders up and down the book would be present to traders, who 
would be assured they would receive all available shares at the best 
possible prices. 
4. Complex order types reduced (and prohibition on locks and 
crosses eliminated) 
As the exchanges attempted to cater to their customers in the 
past decade, the variety of order types mushroomed.242 Many of 
these new order types were designed to allow high-frequency 
traders, the exchanges’ best customers, to position themselves 
advantageously as prices quickly moved around. The complex 
order types therefore came under fire from other traders. At best, 
they appeared to add significant complexity to the market micro-
structure and, at worst, to allow high-frequency traders a way to 
cut in line ahead of others. 
Traditionally there were two basic order types: the limit order 
and the market order. As the national market system was imple-
mented, a number of other order types became common. To name 
just a few, these include intermarket sweep orders (“ISOs”), pegged 
midpoint orders, flash orders, and orders designed to position 
traders at the top of the market when the market “unlocks” or 
“uncrosses” such as the notorious Hide Not Slide.243 In order to 
prevent the irrational and confusing condition of locked or crossed 
markets, Rule 610(d) of Regulation NMS prohibits an exchange 
 
Relating to Enhancements to the Exchange’s Existing Automatic Execution Facility (Sept. 22, 
2004), https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse/nyse200405/jwpeake092204.pdf; Black, supra 
note 86. 
 241. See Oesterle, supra note 35, at 639. 
 242. See supra notes 116–119 and accompanying text. 
 243. See supra notes 167–169 and accompanying text. 
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from posting a bid (buy) order at a price higher than the current 
best offer (sell order) or an offer at a price lower than the current 
best bid.244 
In the current race for speed, however, traders often profit from 
being first in line when a market unlocks or uncrosses, as they will 
then be able to capture a “maker” rebate.245 With the Hide Not Slide 
order, a trade could submit an order that would be hidden if it 
would lock or cross the market, yet would be placed first in line 
when the market changed. While this order allowed an HFT shop 
to eke out profits in such conditions, it appeared to critics that the 
exchanges were allowing them to “cut in line,” so to speak.246 While 
there would likely remain other complex order types, by doing 
away with multiple markets, a CLOB would undercut the need for 
order types that are predicated on a fragmented marketplace. Since 
locks and crosses would not be possible in a single market, the need 
for complex order types to negotiate them will disappear, as well 
as other orders designed to negotiate between different markets, 
such as intermarket sweep orders. 
5. Broker-dealer best execution problems diminish 
The duty of best execution on the part of stockbrokers serves as 
a backstop to the Order Protection Rule. This duty mandates that a 
broker send its client’s order to the exchange where it will receive 
the “best execution.”247 Note that best execution is not defined 
solely in terms of price; speed and the desire to move markets as 
little as possible when placing an order are also legitimate 
considerations for brokers making routing decisions. 
The inducements for order flow from brokers offered by the 
exchanges, ATSs, and large broker-dealers running internal 
matching engines illustrates the value of these orders. The induce-
ments are primarily maker-taker rebates, but flash orders and other 
 
 244. 17 C.F.R. § 242.610(d) (2018) (prohibiting “[l]ocking or crossing quotations”). 
 245. See Schmerken, supra note 169. 
 246. See Patterson & Strasburg, supra note 170. 
 247. See Fragmentation Concept Release, Exchange Act Release No. 34-42450, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 10,577, 10,584 (Feb. 28, 2000); see also Polise, supra note 4, at n.207; FINRA Rule 5310, 
FINRA, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id 
=10455 (last visited Jan. 23, 2019). 
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enticements to get high-frequency traders “to play in one 
exchange’s sandbox” also play a role.248 While maker-taker rebates 
have received criticism for their corrupting influence on stock-
brokers, under an economic analysis they would seem to be a 
natural consequence of the value of liquidity.249 Maker-taker 
rebates should therefore not be seen as an overriding problem with 
today’s trading system. Also important are payments to brokers for 
order flow by large broker-dealers, such as Charles Schwab or 
Citadel, who then settle trades in their internal matching engines.250 
In addition to contributing to the movement of orders away from 
the lit exchanges to dark venues, academic studies indicate that 
such orders frequently do not receive the best price.251 In such 
instances, broker-dealers will likely not have met their duty of best 
execution. On the other hand, it would seem that disclosure of 
maker-taker rebates on the part of brokers to their clients should be 
sufficient to deal with any disquiet due to maker-taker rebates, as 
these rebates naturally arise given the stock exchange’s character as 
an MSP. 
Nevertheless, were a virtual CLOB instituted, problems sur-
rounding the broker’s duty of best execution should diminish 
considerably. For a start, the routing decision would be reduced to 
the primary decision of whether to trade in the lit markets, which 
would use a single limit order book, or in a dark pool or other non-
exchange venue. Furthermore, by offering strict price and time 
protection to all lit orders, a virtual CLOB should be expected to 
diminish the incentive to trade off-exchange.252 The simplification 
of the markets through a virtual CLOB would greatly reduce the 
danger of brokers sending orders to venues where they were at risk 
of receiving less than best execution. 
6. Complexity due to speed bumps disappears 
A virtual CLOB would eliminate the problem of the increasing 
complexity of the market system through the implementation of 
 
 248. ARNUK & SALUZZI, supra note 45, at 84. 
 249. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 250. See Fleckner, supra note 68, at 2570. 
 251. See, e.g., Battalio et al., supra note 160. 
 252. See Colby & Sirri, supra note 223, at 178. 
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“speed bumps” by IEX and other exchanges. In response to the 
outcry over HFT front-running, IEX designed a system specifically 
designed to protect pegged midpoint orders from exploitation by 
high-frequency traders.253 Their system subjects all incoming 
orders to a 350-microsecond “speed bump.” When an order enters 
the IEX system, it traverses a thirty-eight-mile length of coiled 
optical fiber cable that delays the order for 350 microseconds 
(millionths of a second). Updates of pricing information from the 
other exchanges and the SIP are not however subject to this delay.254 
That means that incoming orders receive the benefit of any price 
changes occurring in the national market system at large. Most 
importantly, this delay prevents high-frequency traders from 
reacting to incoming orders before those orders can be filled, 
because any HFT order would itself be 350 microseconds behind 
the current, true NBBO. This system is meant to allow traders to 
operate without the adverse selection risk that trading on the 
normal lit exchanges entails. 
Before the SEC approved IEX’s application to become a 
registered exchange in June 2016,255 the established exchanges and 
a few other players, such as Citadel, waged an intense battle to stop 
it.256 A key objection was that the speed bump introduced a new 
and significant element of complexity into the trading environ-
ment.257 By intentionally delaying incoming orders, the argument 
went, IEX’s new system makes an already complicated system 
more complicated yet, and reduces the reliability of quotes in 
general. On legal grounds, the objectors in fact had a plausible 
argument that because of the built-in delay in IEX’s system, it 
 
 253. See Andrew Upward, IEX: An Intriguing Wrinkle in the National Market System, 
WEEDEN & CO. (Mar. 17, 2016), www.weedenco.com/market-intelligence/market-structure. 
 254. See Investors’ Exchange LLC, Comment Letter Regarding Investor’s Exchange 
LLC Form 1 Application (Release No. 34-75925; File No. 10-222) (Nov. 13, 2015), https:// 
www.sec.gov/comments/10-222/10222-20.pdf. 
 255. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Approves IEX Proposal to Launch 
National Exchange, Issues Interpretation on Automated Securities Prices (June 17, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-123.html. 
 256. See Annie Massa, IEX Outduels Citadel, NYSE as ‘Flash Boys’ Exchange Approved, 
BLOOMBERG (June 17, 2016), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/O8X 
ZWL6JTSKT?bc=W1siU2VhcmNoIFJlc3VsdHMiLCIvcHJvZHVjdC9ibGF3L3NlYXJjaC9yZ. 
 257. See Dave Michaels, Michaels’s Take: Post-IEX Win, Speed-Bump Fight Goes On, WALL 
STREET J. (July 1, 2016, 7:31 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/michaelss-take-post-iex 
-win-speed-bump-fight-goes-on-1467372715. 
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should not qualify as an “automated trading center,” with its 
quotes entitled to “protected” status under Rule 611. The objectors 
focused on language from the Regulation NMS Adopting Release, 
which states that “[t]he term ‘immediate’ precludes any coding of 
automated systems or other type of intentional device that would 
delay the action taken with respect to a quotation.”258 The SEC, 
however, ruled in favor of IEX, determining that the 350 micro-
second delay was merely “de minimis.”259 Setting aside the obvious 
questions—If the speed bump were de minimis, why would IEX 
build an entire business on it? And why such vehement opposition 
from the established players?—the SEC stated that the principle of 
providing for competition in the exchange space justified the 
introduction of this new and complex system. As denouement, the 
exchanges revealed that their objections were not in fact based on 
any important principle. They have since announced plans to offer 
exchanges with speed bumps themselves.260 
Whatever the final import of this battle, by doing away with the 
opportunity for arbitrage between the various exchanges, a CLOB 
would eliminate the need for speed bumps as a defensive mech-
anism offered by an exchange. 
7. Avoidance of piecemeal reforms 
A final and not insignificant benefit of the reform proposed here 
would be the avoidance of smaller piecemeal reforms. A number of 
such reforms have been proposed: An access fee pilot program that 
would experiment with smaller fees under Rule 610, thereby low-
ering the permissible maker-taker rebates;261 batched auctions;262 
 
 258. Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 34-51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,534 
(June 29, 2005). 
 259. Inv’rs Exch., LLC for Registration as a Nat’l Sec. Exch., Exchange Act Release No. 
34-78101, 114 SEC Docket 2064, at 77 (June 17, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/rules/other 
/2016/34-78101.pdf. 
 260. See John D’Antona Jr., NYSE American Marketplace Launches, TRADERS MAG. 
(July 25, 2017), http://www.tradersmagazine.com/news/ecns_and_exchanges/nyse-ameri 
can-marketplace-launches-116480-1.html. 
 261. See SEC EQUITY MKT. STRUCTURE ADVISORY COMM., RECOMMENDATION FOR AN 
ACCESS FEE PILOT (July 8, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/emsac/recommendation 
-access-fee-pilot.pdf; Missing: The Access Fee Pilot Proposal, THEMIS TRADING BLOG (Nov. 29, 
2017), http://blog.themistrading.com/2017/11/missing-the-access-fee-pilot-proposal/. 
 262. See Budish et al., supra note 215. 
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revisiting the SEC’s interpretation of Rule 603(a)(2), which enables 
co-location and proprietary data feeds by allowing the exchanges 
to transmit data to HFT servers at the same time it is sent to the SIP, 
thereby greatly aggravating the problem of the staleness of the 
SIP;263 banning maker-taker rebates;264 and subjecting high-
frequency traders to broker-dealer regulation,265 among others. 
All these reforms would involve considerable regulatory study, 
proposals, and public comment, and would each entail second-
order effects as well as significant new complexity in the trading 
system and its governing law. Most importantly, they are all 
intended to mitigate problems that fundamentally arise from the 
current system’s fragmented character. The institution of a virtual 
CLOB would eliminate or mitigate many of the most important 
problems arising from this fragmentation and do so in a way that 
greatly simplifies the national market system. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article argues for a renewed look at the concept of a CLOB 
in light of the dysfunctions of the digital stock markets under 
Regulation NMS. Such a market structure would mitigate or elimi-
nate many of the most important recent problems of the exchanges. 
It also comports with the economic nature of the stock exchange as 
an MSP. Given the investment of the exchanges and other impor-
tant players in the current fragmented system, the institution of a 
CLOB is currently implausible as a matter of political economy. 
Nevertheless, this option should be kept in mind in future debate 
concerning the organization of the stock markets. Regulation NMS 
has only been in force for a decade, but the transformation of 
financial markets by digital technology has already put the national 
market system under considerable strain. Although the compe-
tition Regulation NMS incentivizes has reduced transaction costs 
considerably, its fragmented system has given rise to many other 
less obvious costs. Most importantly, the rising share of data 
revenues generated by the exchanges functions as a sort of tax on 
traders, and by extension investors, who are forced to pay for 
 
 263. See Direct vs SIP Data Feed, NANEX (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.nanex.net/aqck2 
/4599.html; see also Fox et al., supra note 29, at 270–71. 
 264. See Macey & Swensen, supra note 155. 
 265. See White, supra note 218. 
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enhanced data feeds if they are to remain competitive and meet 
their duty of best execution. 
It must be remembered that the need for this market informa-
tion, like many of the more particular problems of fragmentation 
reviewed above, is itself a creation of Regulation NMS. While it is 
unlikely a CLOB will be instituted anytime soon, the economic and 
political events of the past decade caution against investing too 
much in the status quo. In a number of other areas of the economy, 
citizens, consumers, legislators, and regulators are beginning to 
grapple with the implications of dominant MSPs in areas as diverse 
as internet search, retail, and social media and news. While the 
particular regulatory landscape inhabited by the stock exchanges 
differs greatly from these other examples, dominant MSPs pose a 
fundamental challenge to the system of American capitalism, 
which has relied on a large number of enterprises to generate 
broadly distributed benefits from competition. Recognition of the 
powerful tendencies toward centralization in the world of digital 
capitalism and a willingness to implement governance structures 
with a wide variety of inputs may be necessary in the years ahead 
to preserve a workable system of capitalism in the digital environ-
ment of the future. 	  
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